From 20ae93aead22cdc4886084b282741a854a163905 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bernd Helmle <Bernd Helmle mailings@oopsware.de>
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2025 17:55:13 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Add modern SHA-2 based password hashes to pgcrypto.

This adapts the publicly available reference implementation on
https://www.akkadia.org/drepper/SHA-crypt.txt and adds the new
hash algorithms sha256crypt and sha512crypt to crypt() and gen_salt()
respectively.
---
 contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile                    |   3 +-
 contrib/pgcrypto/crypt-gensalt.c             |  84 +++
 contrib/pgcrypto/crypt-sha.c                 | 620 +++++++++++++++++++
 contrib/pgcrypto/expected/crypt-shacrypt.out | 196 ++++++
 contrib/pgcrypto/meson.build                 |   2 +
 contrib/pgcrypto/px-crypt.c                  |  16 +
 contrib/pgcrypto/px-crypt.h                  |  31 +
 contrib/pgcrypto/sql/crypt-shacrypt.sql      |  99 +++
 doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml                   |  42 +-
 9 files changed, 1091 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 contrib/pgcrypto/crypt-sha.c
 create mode 100644 contrib/pgcrypto/expected/crypt-shacrypt.out
 create mode 100644 contrib/pgcrypto/sql/crypt-shacrypt.sql

diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
index 85f1c946813..19c124079fc 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ OBJS = \
 	crypt-des.o \
 	crypt-gensalt.o \
 	crypt-md5.o \
+	crypt-sha.o \
 	mbuf.o \
 	openssl.o \
 	pgcrypto.o \
@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ REGRESS = init md5 sha1 hmac-md5 hmac-sha1 blowfish rijndael \
 	sha2 des 3des cast5 \
 	crypt-des crypt-md5 crypt-blowfish crypt-xdes \
 	pgp-armor pgp-decrypt pgp-encrypt pgp-encrypt-md5 $(CF_PGP_TESTS) \
-	pgp-pubkey-decrypt pgp-pubkey-encrypt pgp-info
+	pgp-pubkey-decrypt pgp-pubkey-encrypt pgp-info crypt-shacrypt
 
 ifdef USE_PGXS
 PG_CONFIG = pg_config
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/crypt-gensalt.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/crypt-gensalt.c
index 740f3612532..c5017bd667c 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/crypt-gensalt.c
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/crypt-gensalt.c
@@ -185,3 +185,87 @@ _crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn(unsigned long count,
 
 	return output;
 }
+
+static char *
+_crypt_gensalt_sha(unsigned long count,
+				   const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size)
+{
+	char * s_ptr = output;
+	unsigned int result_bufsize = PX_SHACRYPT_SALT_BUF_LEN;
+	int rc;
+
+	/* output buffer must be allocated with PX_MAX_SALT_LEN bytes */
+	if (PX_MAX_SALT_LEN < result_bufsize)
+	{
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("invalid size of salt")));
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Care must be taken to not exceed the buffer size allocated for
+	 * the input character buffer.
+	 */
+	if ((PX_SHACRYPT_SALT_LEN_MAX != size)
+		|| (output_size < size))
+	{
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("invalid length of salt buffer")));
+	}
+
+	/* Skip magic bytes, set by callers */
+	s_ptr += 3;
+	if ((rc = pg_snprintf(s_ptr, 18, "rounds=%ld$", count)) <= 0)
+	{
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("cannot format salt string")));
+	}
+
+	/* s_ptr should now be positioned at the start of the salt string */
+	s_ptr += rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Normalize salt string
+	 *
+	 * size of input buffer was checked above to
+	 * not exceed PX_SHACRYPT_SALT_LEN_MAX.
+	 */
+	for (int i = 0; i < size; i++)
+	{
+		*s_ptr = _crypt_itoa64[input[i] & 0x3f];
+		s_ptr++;
+	}
+
+	/* We're done */
+	return output;
+}
+
+char *
+_crypt_gensalt_sha512_rn(unsigned long count,
+						 char const *input, int size,
+						 char *output, int output_size)
+{
+	memset(output, 0, output_size);
+	/* set magic byte for sha512crypt */
+	output[0] = '$';
+	output[1] = '6';
+	output[2] = '$';
+
+	return _crypt_gensalt_sha(count, input, size, output, output_size);
+}
+
+char *
+_crypt_gensalt_sha256_rn(unsigned long count,
+						 const char *input, int size,
+						 char *output, int output_size)
+{
+	memset(output, 0, output_size);
+	/* set magic byte for sha512crypt */
+	output[0] = '$';
+	output[1] = '5';
+	output[2] = '$';
+
+	return _crypt_gensalt_sha(count, input, size, output, output_size);
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/crypt-sha.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/crypt-sha.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..383052a8bc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/crypt-sha.c
@@ -0,0 +1,620 @@
+/*
+ * contrib/pgcrypto/crypt-sha.c
+ *
+ * This implements shacrypt password hash functions and follows the
+ * public available reference implementation from
+ *
+ * https://www.akkadia.org/drepper/SHA-crypt.txt
+ *
+ * This code is public domain.
+ *
+ * Please see the inline comments for details about the algorithm.
+ *
+ * Basically the following code implements password hashing with sha256 and
+ * sha512 digest via OpenSSL. Additionally, an extended salt generation (see
+ * crypt-gensalt.c for details) is provided, which generates a salt suitable
+ * for either sha256crypt and sha512crypt password hash generation.
+ *
+ * Official identifiers for suitable password hashes used in salts are
+ * 5 : sha256crypt and
+ * 6 : sha512crypt
+ *
+ * The hashing code below supports and uses salt length up to 16 bytes. Longer
+ * input is possible, but any additional byte of the input is disregarded.
+ * gen_salt(), when called with a sha256crypt or sha512crypt identifier will
+ * always generate a 16 byte long salt string.
+ *
+ * Output is compatible with any sha256crypt and sha512crypt output
+ * generated by e.g. OpenSSL or libc crypt().
+ *
+ * The described algorithm uses default computing rounds of 5000. Currently,
+ * even when no specific rounds specification is used, we always explicitly
+ * print out the rounds option flag with the final hash password string.
+ *
+ * The length of the specific password hash (without magic bytes and salt
+ * string) is:
+ *
+ * sha256crypt: 43 bytes and
+ * sha512crypt: 86 bytes.
+ *
+ * Overall hashed password length is:
+ *
+ * sha256crypt: 80 bytes and
+ * sha512crypt: 123 bytes
+ *
+ */
+#include "postgres.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+
+#include "px-crypt.h"
+#include "px.h"
+
+typedef enum
+{
+	PGCRYPTO_SHA256CRYPT = 0,
+	PGCRYPTO_SHA512CRYPT = 1,
+	PGCRYPTO_SHA_UNKOWN
+}			PGCRYPTO_SHA_t;
+
+static unsigned char _crypt_itoa64[64 + 1] =
+"./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
+
+/*
+ * Modern UNIX password, based on SHA crypt hashes
+ */
+char *
+px_crypt_shacrypt(const char *pw, const char *salt, char *passwd, unsigned dstlen)
+{
+	static const char rounds_prefix[] = "rounds=";
+	static char *magic_bytes[2] = {"$5$", "$6$"};
+
+	/* Used to create the password hash string */
+	StringInfo	out_buf = NULL;
+
+	PGCRYPTO_SHA_t type = PGCRYPTO_SHA_UNKOWN;
+	PX_MD	   *digestA = NULL;
+	PX_MD	   *digestB = NULL;
+	int			err;
+
+	const char *dec_salt_binary;	/* pointer into the real salt string */
+
+	unsigned char sha_buf[PX_SHACRYPT_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	unsigned char sha_buf_tmp[PX_SHACRYPT_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];	/* temporary buffer for
+																 * digests */
+
+	char		rounds_custom = 0;
+	char	   *p_bytes = NULL;
+	char	   *s_bytes = NULL;
+	char	   *cp = NULL;
+	const char *ep;				/* holds pointer to the end of the salt string */
+
+	size_t		buf_size = 0;	/* buffer size for sha256crypt/sha512crypt */
+	unsigned int block;			/* number of bytes processed */
+	unsigned long rounds = PX_SHACRYPT_ROUNDS_DEFAULT;
+
+	unsigned	len,
+				salt_len;
+
+	/* Init result buffer */
+	out_buf = makeStringInfoExt(PX_SHACRYPT_BUF_LEN);
+
+	/* Sanity checks */
+	if (!passwd)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (pw == NULL)
+	{
+		elog(ERROR, "null value for password rejected");
+	}
+
+	if (salt == NULL)
+	{
+		elog(ERROR, "null value for salt rejected");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Make sure result buffers are large enough.
+	 */
+	if (dstlen < PX_SHACRYPT_BUF_LEN)
+	{
+		elog(ERROR, "insufficient result buffer size to encrypt password");
+	}
+
+	/* Init contents of buffers properly */
+	memset(&sha_buf, '\0', sizeof(sha_buf));
+	memset(&sha_buf_tmp, '\0', sizeof(sha_buf_tmp));
+
+	/*
+	 * Decode the salt string. We need to know how many rounds and which
+	 * digest we have to use to hash the password.
+	 */
+	len = strlen(pw);
+	dec_salt_binary = salt;
+
+	/*
+	 * Analyze and prepare the salt string
+	 *
+	 * The magic string should be specified in the first three bytes of the
+	 * salt string. But do some sanity checks before.
+	 */
+	if (strlen(dec_salt_binary) < 3)
+	{
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+				 errmsg("invalid salt")));
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check format of magic bytes. These should define either 5=sha256crypt
+	 * or 6=sha512crypt in the second byte, enclosed by ascii dollar signs.
+	 */
+	if ((dec_salt_binary[0] != '$')
+		&& (dec_salt_binary[2] != '$'))
+	{
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+				 errmsg("invalid format of salt")),
+				errhint("magic byte format for shacrypt is either \"$5$\" or \"$6$\""));
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check magic byte for supported shacrypt digest.
+	 *
+	 * We're just interested in the very first 3 bytes of the salt string,
+	 * since this defines the digest length to use.
+	 */
+	if (strncmp(dec_salt_binary, magic_bytes[0], strlen(magic_bytes[0])) == 0)
+	{
+		type = PGCRYPTO_SHA256CRYPT;
+		dec_salt_binary += strlen(magic_bytes[0]);
+	}
+	else if (strncmp(dec_salt_binary, magic_bytes[1], strlen(magic_bytes[1])) == 0)
+	{
+		type = PGCRYPTO_SHA512CRYPT;
+		dec_salt_binary += strlen(magic_bytes[1]);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * dec_salt_binary pointer is positioned after the magic bytes now
+	 *
+	 * We extract any options in the following code branch. The only optional
+	 * setting we need to take care of is the "rounds" option. Note that the
+	 * salt generator already checked for invalid settings before, but we need
+	 * to do it here again to protect against injection of wrong values when
+	 * called without the generator.
+	 *
+	 * If there is any garbage added after the magic byte and the options/salt
+	 * string, we don't treat this special: This is just absorbed as part of
+	 * the salt with up to PX_SHACRYPT_SALT_LEN_MAX.
+	 *
+	 * Unknown magic byte is handled later below
+	 */
+	if (strncmp(dec_salt_binary,
+				rounds_prefix, sizeof(rounds_prefix) - 1) == 0)
+	{
+
+		const char *num = dec_salt_binary + sizeof(rounds_prefix) - 1;
+		char	   *endp;
+		long		srounds = strtoul(num, &endp, 10);
+
+		if (*endp == '$')
+		{
+			dec_salt_binary = endp + 1;
+
+			/*
+			 * We violate supported lower or upper bound of rounds, but in
+			 * this case we change this value to the supported lower or upper
+			 * value. We don't do this silently and print a NOTICE in such a
+			 * case.
+			 *
+			 * Note that a salt string generated with gen_salt() would never
+			 * generated such a salt string, since it would error out.
+			 *
+			 * But Drepper's upstream reference implementation supports this
+			 * when passing the salt string directly, so we maintain
+			 * compatibility here.
+			 */
+			if (srounds > PX_SHACRYPT_ROUNDS_MAX)
+			{
+				ereport(NOTICE,
+						errcode(ERRCODE_NUMERIC_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE),
+						errmsg("rounds=%ld exceeds maximum supported value (%ld), using %ld instead",
+							   srounds, PX_SHACRYPT_ROUNDS_MAX,
+							   PX_SHACRYPT_ROUNDS_MAX));
+				srounds = PX_SHACRYPT_ROUNDS_MAX;
+			}
+			else if (srounds < PX_SHACRYPT_ROUNDS_MIN)
+			{
+				ereport(NOTICE,
+						errcode(ERRCODE_NUMERIC_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE),
+						errmsg("rounds=%ld is below supported value (%ld), using %ld instead",
+							   srounds, PX_SHACRYPT_ROUNDS_MIN,
+							   PX_SHACRYPT_ROUNDS_MIN));
+				srounds = PX_SHACRYPT_ROUNDS_MIN;
+			}
+
+			rounds = (unsigned long) srounds;
+			rounds_custom = 1;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
+					errmsg("could not parse salt options"));
+		}
+
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Choose the correct digest length and add the magic bytes to the result
+	 * buffer. Also handle possible invalid magic byte we've extracted above.
+	 */
+	switch (type)
+	{
+		case PGCRYPTO_SHA256CRYPT:
+			{
+				/* Two PX_MD objects required */
+				err = px_find_digest("sha256", &digestA);
+				if (err)
+					goto error;
+
+				err = px_find_digest("sha256", &digestB);
+				if (err)
+					goto error;
+
+				/* digest buffer length is 32 for sha256 */
+				buf_size = 32;
+
+				appendStringInfoString(out_buf, magic_bytes[0]);
+				break;
+			}
+
+		case PGCRYPTO_SHA512CRYPT:
+			{
+				/* Two PX_MD objects required */
+				err = px_find_digest("sha512", &digestA);
+				if (err)
+					goto error;
+
+				err = px_find_digest("sha512", &digestB);
+				if (err)
+					goto error;
+
+				buf_size = PX_SHACRYPT_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+				appendStringInfoString(out_buf, magic_bytes[1]);
+				break;
+			}
+
+		case PGCRYPTO_SHA_UNKOWN:
+			elog(ERROR, "unknown crypt identifier \"%c\"", salt[1]);
+	}
+
+	if (rounds_custom > 0)
+	{
+		appendStringInfo(out_buf, "rounds=%lu$", rounds);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We need the real length of the decoded salt string, this is every
+	 * character before the last '$' in the preamble. Append every character
+	 * up to PX_SHACRYPT_SALT_LEN_MAX to the result buffer.
+	 */
+	for (ep = dec_salt_binary;
+		 *ep && *ep != '$' && ep < (dec_salt_binary + PX_SHACRYPT_SALT_LEN_MAX);
+		 ep++)
+		appendStringInfoCharMacro(out_buf, *ep);
+	salt_len = ep - dec_salt_binary;
+
+	elog(DEBUG1, "using salt len = %d", salt_len);
+
+	/*
+	 * Sanity check:
+	 *
+	 * At this point the salt string buffer must not exceed expected size
+	 */
+	if (out_buf->len > (3 + 17 * rounds_custom + salt_len))
+	{
+		elog(ERROR, "unexpected length of salt string");
+	}
+
+	/*-
+	 * 1. Start digest A
+	 * 2. Add the password string to digest A
+	 * 3. Add the salt to digest A
+	 */
+	px_md_update(digestA, (const unsigned char *) pw, len);
+	px_md_update(digestA, (const unsigned char *) dec_salt_binary, salt_len);
+
+	/*-
+	 * 4. Create digest B
+	 * 5. Add password to digest B
+	 * 6. Add the salt string to digest B
+	 * 7. Add the password again to digest B
+	 * 8. Finalize digest B
+	 */
+	px_md_update(digestB, (const unsigned char *) pw, len);
+	px_md_update(digestB, (const unsigned char *) dec_salt_binary, salt_len);
+	px_md_update(digestB, (const unsigned char *) pw, len);
+	px_md_finish(digestB, sha_buf);
+
+	/*-
+	 * 9. For each block of (excluding the NULL byte), add
+	 *    digest B to digest A.
+	 */
+	for (block = len; block > buf_size; block -= buf_size)
+	{
+		px_md_update(digestA, sha_buf, buf_size);
+	}
+
+	/*-
+	 * 10 For the remaining N bytes of the password string, add
+	 * the first N bytes of digest B to A */
+	px_md_update(digestA, sha_buf, block);
+
+	/*-
+	 * 11 For each bit of the binary representation of the length of the
+	 * password string up to and including the highest 1-digit, starting
+	 * from to lowest bit position (numeric value 1)
+	 *
+	 * a) for a 1-digit add digest B (sha_buf) to digest A
+	 * b) for a 0-digit add the password string
+	 */
+
+	block = len;
+	while (block)
+	{
+		px_md_update(digestA,
+					 (block & 1) ? sha_buf : (const unsigned char *) pw,
+					 (block & 1) ? buf_size : len);
+
+		/* right shift to next byte */
+		block >>= 1;
+	}
+
+	/* 12 Finalize digest A */
+	px_md_finish(digestA, sha_buf);
+
+	/* 13 Start digest DP */
+	px_md_reset(digestB);
+
+	/*-
+	 * 14 Add every byte of the password string (excluding trailing NULL)
+	 * to the digest DP
+	 */
+	for (block = len; block > 0; block--)
+	{
+		px_md_update(digestB, (const unsigned char *) pw, len);
+	}
+
+	/* 15 Finalize digest DP */
+	px_md_finish(digestB, sha_buf_tmp);
+
+	/*-
+	 * 16 produce byte sequence P with same length as password.
+	 *
+	 *     a) for each block of 32 or 64 bytes of length of the password
+	 *        string the entire digest DP is used
+	 *     b) for the remaining N (up to  31 or 63) bytes use the
+	 *         first N bytes of digest DP
+	 */
+	if ((p_bytes = palloc0(len)) == NULL)
+	{
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	/* N step of 16, copy over the bytes from password */
+	for (cp = p_bytes, block = len; block > buf_size; block -= buf_size, cp += buf_size)
+		memcpy(cp, sha_buf_tmp, buf_size);
+	memcpy(cp, sha_buf_tmp, block);
+
+	/*
+	 * 17 Start digest DS
+	 */
+	px_md_reset(digestB);
+
+	/*-
+	 * 18 Repeat the following 16+A[0] times, where A[0] represents the first
+	 *    byte in digest A interpreted as an 8-bit unsigned value
+	 *    add the salt to digest DS
+	 */
+	for (block = 16 + sha_buf[0]; block > 0; block--)
+	{
+		px_md_update(digestB, (const unsigned char *) dec_salt_binary, salt_len);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * 19 Finalize digest DS
+	 */
+	px_md_finish(digestB, sha_buf_tmp);
+
+	/*-
+	 * 20 Produce byte sequence S of the same length as the salt string where
+	 *
+	 * a) for each block of 32 or 64 bytes of length of the salt string the
+	 *     entire digest DS is used
+	 *
+	 * b) for the remaining N (up to  31 or 63) bytes use the first N
+	 *    bytes of digest DS
+	 */
+	if ((s_bytes = palloc0(salt_len)) == NULL)
+		goto error;
+
+	for (cp = s_bytes, block = salt_len; block > buf_size; block -= buf_size, cp += buf_size)
+	{
+		memcpy(cp, sha_buf_tmp, buf_size);
+	}
+	memcpy(cp, sha_buf_tmp, block);
+
+	/* Make sure we don't leave something important behind */
+	px_memset(&sha_buf_tmp, 0, sizeof sha_buf);
+
+	/*-
+	 * 21 Repeat a loop according to the number specified in the rounds=<N>
+	 *    specification in the salt (or the default value if none is
+	 *    present).  Each round is numbered, starting with 0 and up to N-1.
+	 *
+	 *    The loop uses a digest as input.  In the first round it is the
+	 *    digest produced in step 12.  In the latter steps it is the digest
+	 *    produced in step 21.h of the previous round.  The following text
+	 *    uses the notation "digest A/B" to describe this behavior.
+	 */
+	for (block = 0; block < rounds; block++)
+	{
+
+		/*
+		 * Make it possible to abort in case large values for "rounds" are
+		 * specified.
+		 */
+		CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();
+
+		/* a) start digest B */
+		px_md_reset(digestB);
+
+		/*
+		 * b) for odd round numbers add the byte sequense P to digest B c) for
+		 * even round numbers add digest A/B
+		 */
+		px_md_update(digestB,
+					 (block & 1) ? (const unsigned char *) p_bytes : sha_buf,
+					 (block & 1) ? len : buf_size);
+
+		/* d) for all round numbers not divisible by 3 add the byte sequence S */
+		if (block % 3)
+		{
+			px_md_update(digestB, (const unsigned char *) s_bytes, salt_len);
+		}
+
+		/* e) for all round numbers not divisible by 7 add the byte sequence P */
+		if (block % 7)
+		{
+			px_md_update(digestB, (const unsigned char *) p_bytes, len);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * f) for odd round numbers add digest A/C g) for even round numbers
+		 * add the byte sequence P
+		 */
+		px_md_update(digestB,
+					 (block & 1) ? sha_buf : (const unsigned char *) p_bytes,
+					 (block & 1) ? buf_size : len);
+
+		/* h) finish digest C. */
+		px_md_finish(digestB, sha_buf);
+
+	}
+
+	px_md_free(digestA);
+	px_md_free(digestB);
+
+	digestA = NULL;
+	digestB = NULL;
+
+	pfree(s_bytes);
+	pfree(p_bytes);
+
+	s_bytes = NULL;
+	p_bytes = NULL;
+
+	/* prepare final result buffer */
+	appendStringInfoCharMacro(out_buf, '$');
+
+#define b64_from_24bit(B2, B1, B0, N)                      \
+	do {                                                    \
+		unsigned int w = ((B2) << 16) | ((B1) << 8) | (B0); \
+		int i = (N);                                        \
+		while (i-- > 0)                                     \
+		{                                                   \
+			appendStringInfoCharMacro(out_buf, _crypt_itoa64[w & 0x3f]); \
+			w >>= 6;                                        \
+		}                                                   \
+	} while (0)
+
+	switch (type)
+	{
+		case PGCRYPTO_SHA256CRYPT:
+			{
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[0], sha_buf[10], sha_buf[20], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[21], sha_buf[1], sha_buf[11], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[12], sha_buf[22], sha_buf[2], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[3], sha_buf[13], sha_buf[23], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[24], sha_buf[4], sha_buf[14], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[15], sha_buf[25], sha_buf[5], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[6], sha_buf[16], sha_buf[26], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[27], sha_buf[7], sha_buf[17], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[18], sha_buf[28], sha_buf[8], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[9], sha_buf[19], sha_buf[29], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(0, sha_buf[31], sha_buf[30], 3);
+
+				break;
+			}
+
+		case PGCRYPTO_SHA512CRYPT:
+			{
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[0], sha_buf[21], sha_buf[42], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[22], sha_buf[43], sha_buf[1], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[44], sha_buf[2], sha_buf[23], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[3], sha_buf[24], sha_buf[45], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[25], sha_buf[46], sha_buf[4], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[47], sha_buf[5], sha_buf[26], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[6], sha_buf[27], sha_buf[48], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[28], sha_buf[49], sha_buf[7], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[50], sha_buf[8], sha_buf[29], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[9], sha_buf[30], sha_buf[51], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[31], sha_buf[52], sha_buf[10], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[53], sha_buf[11], sha_buf[32], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[12], sha_buf[33], sha_buf[54], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[34], sha_buf[55], sha_buf[13], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[56], sha_buf[14], sha_buf[35], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[15], sha_buf[36], sha_buf[57], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[37], sha_buf[58], sha_buf[16], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[59], sha_buf[17], sha_buf[38], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[18], sha_buf[39], sha_buf[60], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[40], sha_buf[61], sha_buf[19], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(sha_buf[62], sha_buf[20], sha_buf[41], 4);
+				b64_from_24bit(0, 0, sha_buf[63], 2);
+
+				break;
+			}
+
+		case PGCRYPTO_SHA_UNKOWN:
+			/* we shouldn't land here ... */
+			elog(ERROR, "unsupported digest length");
+
+	}
+
+	*cp = '\0';
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy over result to specified buffer.
+	 *
+	 * The passwd character buffer should have at least PX_SHACRYPT_BUF_LEN
+	 * allocated, since we checked above if dstlen is smaller than
+	 * PX_SHACRYPT_BUF_LEN (which also includes the NULL byte).
+	 *
+	 * In that case we would have failed above already.
+	 */
+	memcpy(passwd, out_buf->data, out_buf->len);
+
+	/* make sure nothing important is left behind */
+	px_memset(&sha_buf, 0, sizeof sha_buf);
+	destroyStringInfo(out_buf);
+
+	/* ...and we're done */
+	return passwd;
+
+error:
+	if (digestA != NULL)
+		px_md_free(digestA);
+
+	if (digestB != NULL)
+		px_md_free(digestB);
+
+	if (out_buf != NULL)
+		destroyStringInfo(out_buf);
+
+	ereport(ERROR,
+			(errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
+			 errmsg("cannot create encrypted password")));
+	return NULL;				/* keep compiler quiet */
+}
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/expected/crypt-shacrypt.out b/contrib/pgcrypto/expected/crypt-shacrypt.out
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..f3b76d5e913
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/expected/crypt-shacrypt.out
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+--
+-- crypt() and gensalt: sha256crypt, sha512crypt
+--
+-- $5$ is sha256crypt
+SELECT crypt('', '$5$Szzz0yzz');
+                          crypt                          
+---------------------------------------------------------
+ $5$Szzz0yzz$cA.ZFZKqblRYjdsbrWtVTYa/qSwPQnt2uh0LBtyYAAD
+(1 row)
+
+SELECT crypt('foox', '$5$Szzz0yzz');
+                          crypt                          
+---------------------------------------------------------
+ $5$Szzz0yzz$7hI0rUWkO2QdBkzamh.vP.MIPlbZiwSvu2smhSi6064
+(1 row)
+
+CREATE TABLE ctest (data text, res text, salt text);
+INSERT INTO ctest VALUES ('password', '', '');
+-- generate a salt for sha256crypt, default rounds
+UPDATE ctest SET salt = gen_salt('sha256crypt');
+UPDATE ctest SET res = crypt(data, salt);
+SELECT res = crypt(data, res) AS "worked"
+FROM ctest;
+ worked 
+--------
+ t
+(1 row)
+
+-- generate a salt for sha256crypt, rounds 9999
+UPDATE ctest SET salt = gen_salt('sha256crypt', 9999);
+UPDATE ctest SET res = crypt(data, salt);
+SELECT res = crypt(data, res) AS "worked"
+FROM ctest;
+ worked 
+--------
+ t
+(1 row)
+
+-- should fail, below supported minimum rounds value
+UPDATE ctest SET salt = gen_salt('sha256crypt', 10);
+ERROR:  gen_salt: Incorrect number of rounds
+-- should fail, exceeds supported maximum rounds value
+UPDATE ctest SET salt = gen_salt('sha256crypt', 1000000000);
+ERROR:  gen_salt: Incorrect number of rounds
+TRUNCATE ctest;
+-- $6$ is sha512crypt
+SELECT crypt('', '$6$Szzz0yzz');
+                                               crypt                                                
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ $6$Szzz0yzz$EGj.JLAovFyAtCJx3YD1DXD1yTXoO9gv4qgLyHBsJJ1lkpnLB8ZPHekm1qXjJCOBc/8thCuHpxNN8Y5xzRYU5.
+(1 row)
+
+SELECT crypt('foox', '$6$Szzz0yzz');
+                                               crypt                                                
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ $6$Szzz0yzz$KqDw1Y8kze.VFapkvTc9Y5fbqzltjeRz1aPGC/pkHRhFQZ2aM6PmZpXQjcD7AOH88Bq0CSD.VlmymQzcBMEUl0
+(1 row)
+
+INSERT INTO ctest VALUES ('password', '', '');
+-- generate a salt for sha512crypt, default rounds
+UPDATE ctest SET salt = gen_salt('sha512crypt');
+UPDATE ctest SET res = crypt(data, salt);
+SELECT res = crypt(data, res) AS "worked"
+FROM ctest;
+ worked 
+--------
+ t
+(1 row)
+
+-- generate a salt for sha512crypt, rounds 9999
+UPDATE ctest SET salt = gen_salt('sha512crypt', 9999);
+UPDATE ctest SET res = crypt(data, salt);
+SELECT res = crypt(data, res) AS "worked"
+FROM ctest;
+ worked 
+--------
+ t
+(1 row)
+
+-- should fail, below supported minimum rounds value
+UPDATE ctest SET salt = gen_salt('sha512crypt', 10);
+ERROR:  gen_salt: Incorrect number of rounds
+-- should fail, exceeds supported maximum rounds value
+UPDATE ctest SET salt = gen_salt('sha512crypt', 1000000000);
+ERROR:  gen_salt: Incorrect number of rounds
+-- Extended tests taken from public domain code at
+-- https://www.akkadia.org/drepper/SHA-crypt.txt
+--
+-- We adapt the tests defined there to make sure we are compatible with the reference
+-- implementation.
+-- This tests sha256crypt (magic byte $5$ with salt and rounds)
+SELECT crypt('Hello world!', '$5$saltstring')
+           = '$5$saltstring$5B8vYYiY.CVt1RlTTf8KbXBH3hsxY/GNooZaBBGWEc5' AS result;
+ result 
+--------
+ t
+(1 row)
+
+SELECT crypt('Hello world!', '$5$rounds=10000$saltstringsaltstring')
+           = '$5$rounds=10000$saltstringsaltst$3xv.VbSHBb41AL9AvLeujZkZRBAwqFMz2.opqey6IcA' AS result;
+ result 
+--------
+ t
+(1 row)
+
+SELECT crypt('This is just a test', '$5$rounds=5000$toolongsaltstring')
+           = '$5$rounds=5000$toolongsaltstrin$Un/5jzAHMgOGZ5.mWJpuVolil07guHPvOW8mGRcvxa5' AS result;
+ result 
+--------
+ t
+(1 row)
+
+ SELECT crypt('a very much longer text to encrypt.  This one even stretches over more'
+     'than one line.', '$5$rounds=1400$anotherlongsaltstring')
+            = '$5$rounds=1400$anotherlongsalts$Rx.j8H.h8HjEDGomFU8bDkXm3XIUnzyxf12oP84Bnq1' AS result;
+ result 
+--------
+ t
+(1 row)
+
+SELECT crypt('we have a short salt string but not a short password', '$5$rounds=77777$short')
+           = '$5$rounds=77777$short$JiO1O3ZpDAxGJeaDIuqCoEFysAe1mZNJRs3pw0KQRd/' AS result;
+ result 
+--------
+ t
+(1 row)
+
+SELECT crypt('a short string', '$5$rounds=123456$asaltof16chars..')
+           = '$5$rounds=123456$asaltof16chars..$gP3VQ/6X7UUEW3HkBn2w1/Ptq2jxPyzV/cZKmF/wJvD' AS result;
+ result 
+--------
+ t
+(1 row)
+
+SELECT crypt('the minimum number is still observed', '$5$rounds=10$roundstoolow')
+           = '$5$rounds=1000$roundstoolow$yfvwcWrQ8l/K0DAWyuPMDNHpIVlTQebY9l/gL972bIC' AS result;
+NOTICE:  rounds=10 is below supported value (1000), using 1000 instead
+ result 
+--------
+ t
+(1 row)
+
+-- The following tests sha512crypt (magic byte $6$ with salt and rounds)
+SELECT crypt('Hello world!', '$6$saltstring')
+           = '$6$saltstring$svn8UoSVapNtMuq1ukKS4tPQd8iKwSMHWjl/O817G3uBnIFNjnQJuesI68u4OTLiBFdcbYEdFCoEOfaS35inz1' AS result;
+ result 
+--------
+ t
+(1 row)
+
+SELECT crypt('Hello world!', '$6$rounds=10000$saltstringsaltstring')
+           = '$6$rounds=10000$saltstringsaltst$OW1/O6BYHV6BcXZu8QVeXbDWra3Oeqh0sbHbbMCVNSnCM/UrjmM0Dp8vOuZeHBy/YTBmSK6H9qs/y3RnOaw5v.' AS result;
+ result 
+--------
+ t
+(1 row)
+
+SELECT crypt('This is just a test', '$6$rounds=5000$toolongsaltstring')
+           = '$6$rounds=5000$toolongsaltstrin$lQ8jolhgVRVhY4b5pZKaysCLi0QBxGoNeKQzQ3glMhwllF7oGDZxUhx1yxdYcz/e1JSbq3y6JMxxl8audkUEm0' AS result;
+ result 
+--------
+ t
+(1 row)
+
+SELECT crypt('a very much longer text to encrypt.  This one even stretches over more'
+                 'than one line.', '$6$rounds=1400$anotherlongsaltstring')
+           = '$6$rounds=1400$anotherlongsalts$POfYwTEok97VWcjxIiSOjiykti.o/pQs.wPvMxQ6Fm7I6IoYN3CmLs66x9t0oSwbtEW7o7UmJEiDwGqd8p4ur1' AS result;
+ result 
+--------
+ t
+(1 row)
+
+SELECT crypt('we have a short salt string but not a short password', '$6$rounds=77777$short')
+           = '$6$rounds=77777$short$WuQyW2YR.hBNpjjRhpYD/ifIw05xdfeEyQoMxIXbkvr0gge1a1x3yRULJ5CCaUeOxFmtlcGZelFl5CxtgfiAc0' AS result;
+ result 
+--------
+ t
+(1 row)
+
+SELECT crypt('a short string', '$6$rounds=123456$asaltof16chars..')
+           = '$6$rounds=123456$asaltof16chars..$BtCwjqMJGx5hrJhZywWvt0RLE8uZ4oPwcelCjmw2kSYu.Ec6ycULevoBK25fs2xXgMNrCzIMVcgEJAstJeonj1' AS result;
+ result 
+--------
+ t
+(1 row)
+
+SELECT crypt('the minimum number is still observed', '$6$rounds=10$roundstoolow')
+           = '$6$rounds=1000$roundstoolow$kUMsbe306n21p9R.FRkW3IGn.S9NPN0x50YhH1xhLsPuWGsUSklZt58jaTfF4ZEQpyUNGc0dqbpBYYBaHHrsX.' AS result;
+NOTICE:  rounds=10 is below supported value (1000), using 1000 instead
+ result 
+--------
+ t
+(1 row)
+
+-- cleanup
+DROP TABLE ctest;
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/meson.build b/contrib/pgcrypto/meson.build
index 0bcbe4cfe5a..2fdba051290 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/meson.build
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/meson.build
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ pgcrypto_sources = files(
   'crypt-des.c',
   'crypt-gensalt.c',
   'crypt-md5.c',
+  'crypt-sha.c',
   'mbuf.c',
   'pgcrypto.c',
   'pgp-armor.c',
@@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ pgcrypto_regress = [
   'pgp-pubkey-decrypt',
   'pgp-pubkey-encrypt',
   'pgp-info',
+  'crypt-shacrypt'
 ]
 
 pgcrypto_openssl_sources = files(
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/px-crypt.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/px-crypt.c
index 0913ff2c1bc..fe982f23805 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/px-crypt.c
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/px-crypt.c
@@ -67,6 +67,16 @@ run_crypt_bf(const char *psw, const char *salt,
 	return res;
 }
 
+static char *
+run_crypt_sha(const char *psw, const char *salt,
+			  char *buf, unsigned len)
+{
+	char *res;
+
+	res = px_crypt_shacrypt(psw, salt, buf, len);
+	return res;
+}
+
 struct px_crypt_algo
 {
 	char	   *id;
@@ -81,6 +91,8 @@ static const struct px_crypt_algo
 	{"$2x$", 4, run_crypt_bf},
 	{"$2$", 3, NULL},			/* N/A */
 	{"$1$", 3, run_crypt_md5},
+	{"$5$", 3, run_crypt_sha},
+	{"$6$", 3, run_crypt_sha},
 	{"_", 1, run_crypt_des},
 	{"", 0, run_crypt_des},
 	{NULL, 0, NULL}
@@ -125,6 +137,10 @@ static struct generator gen_list[] = {
 	{"md5", _crypt_gensalt_md5_rn, 6, 0, 0, 0},
 	{"xdes", _crypt_gensalt_extended_rn, 3, PX_XDES_ROUNDS, 1, 0xFFFFFF},
 	{"bf", _crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn, 16, PX_BF_ROUNDS, 4, 31},
+	{"sha256crypt", _crypt_gensalt_sha256_rn, PX_SHACRYPT_SALT_LEN_MAX,
+	 PX_SHACRYPT_ROUNDS_DEFAULT, PX_SHACRYPT_ROUNDS_MIN, PX_SHACRYPT_ROUNDS_MAX},
+	{"sha512crypt", _crypt_gensalt_sha512_rn, PX_SHACRYPT_SALT_LEN_MAX,
+	 PX_SHACRYPT_ROUNDS_DEFAULT, PX_SHACRYPT_ROUNDS_MIN, PX_SHACRYPT_ROUNDS_MAX},
 	{NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0}
 };
 
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/px-crypt.h b/contrib/pgcrypto/px-crypt.h
index 54de8069655..97241194fb3 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/px-crypt.h
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/px-crypt.h
@@ -45,6 +45,30 @@
 /* default for blowfish salt */
 #define PX_BF_ROUNDS		6
 
+/* Maximum salt string length of shacrypt.  */
+#define PX_SHACRYPT_SALT_LEN_MAX 16
+
+/* SHA buffer length */
+#define PX_SHACRYPT_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH 64
+
+/* calculated buffer size of a buffer to store a shacrypt salt string */
+#define PX_SHACRYPT_SALT_BUF_LEN (3 + 7 + 10 + PX_SHACRYPT_SALT_LEN_MAX + 1)
+
+/*
+ * calculated buffer size of a buffer to store complete result of a shacrypt
+ * digest including salt
+ */
+#define PX_SHACRYPT_BUF_LEN PX_SHACRYPT_SALT_BUF_LEN + 86 + 1
+
+/* Default number of rounds of shacrypt if not explicitly specified.  */
+#define PX_SHACRYPT_ROUNDS_DEFAULT 5000
+
+/* Minimum number of rounds of shacrypt.  */
+#define PX_SHACRYPT_ROUNDS_MIN 1000l
+
+/* Maximum number of rounds of shacrypt.  */
+#define PX_SHACRYPT_ROUNDS_MAX 999999999l
+
 /*
  * main interface
  */
@@ -64,6 +88,10 @@ char	   *_crypt_gensalt_md5_rn(unsigned long count,
 								  const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size);
 char	   *_crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn(unsigned long count,
 									   const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size);
+char	   *_crypt_gensalt_sha256_rn(unsigned long count,
+									 const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size);
+char	   *_crypt_gensalt_sha512_rn(unsigned long count,
+									 const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size);
 
 /* disable 'extended DES crypt' */
 /* #define DISABLE_XDES */
@@ -79,4 +107,7 @@ char	   *px_crypt_des(const char *key, const char *setting);
 char	   *px_crypt_md5(const char *pw, const char *salt,
 						 char *passwd, unsigned dstlen);
 
+/* crypt-sha.c */
+char       *px_crypt_shacrypt(const char *pw, const char *salt, char *passwd, unsigned dstlen);
+
 #endif							/* _PX_CRYPT_H */
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/sql/crypt-shacrypt.sql b/contrib/pgcrypto/sql/crypt-shacrypt.sql
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..3ee826f61aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/sql/crypt-shacrypt.sql
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+--
+-- crypt() and gensalt: sha256crypt, sha512crypt
+--
+
+-- $5$ is sha256crypt
+SELECT crypt('', '$5$Szzz0yzz');
+
+SELECT crypt('foox', '$5$Szzz0yzz');
+
+CREATE TABLE ctest (data text, res text, salt text);
+INSERT INTO ctest VALUES ('password', '', '');
+
+-- generate a salt for sha256crypt, default rounds
+UPDATE ctest SET salt = gen_salt('sha256crypt');
+UPDATE ctest SET res = crypt(data, salt);
+SELECT res = crypt(data, res) AS "worked"
+FROM ctest;
+
+-- generate a salt for sha256crypt, rounds 9999
+UPDATE ctest SET salt = gen_salt('sha256crypt', 9999);
+UPDATE ctest SET res = crypt(data, salt);
+SELECT res = crypt(data, res) AS "worked"
+FROM ctest;
+
+-- should fail, below supported minimum rounds value
+UPDATE ctest SET salt = gen_salt('sha256crypt', 10);
+
+-- should fail, exceeds supported maximum rounds value
+UPDATE ctest SET salt = gen_salt('sha256crypt', 1000000000);
+
+TRUNCATE ctest;
+
+-- $6$ is sha512crypt
+SELECT crypt('', '$6$Szzz0yzz');
+
+SELECT crypt('foox', '$6$Szzz0yzz');
+
+INSERT INTO ctest VALUES ('password', '', '');
+
+-- generate a salt for sha512crypt, default rounds
+UPDATE ctest SET salt = gen_salt('sha512crypt');
+UPDATE ctest SET res = crypt(data, salt);
+SELECT res = crypt(data, res) AS "worked"
+FROM ctest;
+
+-- generate a salt for sha512crypt, rounds 9999
+UPDATE ctest SET salt = gen_salt('sha512crypt', 9999);
+UPDATE ctest SET res = crypt(data, salt);
+SELECT res = crypt(data, res) AS "worked"
+FROM ctest;
+
+-- should fail, below supported minimum rounds value
+UPDATE ctest SET salt = gen_salt('sha512crypt', 10);
+
+-- should fail, exceeds supported maximum rounds value
+UPDATE ctest SET salt = gen_salt('sha512crypt', 1000000000);
+
+-- Extended tests taken from public domain code at
+-- https://www.akkadia.org/drepper/SHA-crypt.txt
+--
+-- We adapt the tests defined there to make sure we are compatible with the reference
+-- implementation.
+
+-- This tests sha256crypt (magic byte $5$ with salt and rounds)
+SELECT crypt('Hello world!', '$5$saltstring')
+           = '$5$saltstring$5B8vYYiY.CVt1RlTTf8KbXBH3hsxY/GNooZaBBGWEc5' AS result;
+SELECT crypt('Hello world!', '$5$rounds=10000$saltstringsaltstring')
+           = '$5$rounds=10000$saltstringsaltst$3xv.VbSHBb41AL9AvLeujZkZRBAwqFMz2.opqey6IcA' AS result;
+SELECT crypt('This is just a test', '$5$rounds=5000$toolongsaltstring')
+           = '$5$rounds=5000$toolongsaltstrin$Un/5jzAHMgOGZ5.mWJpuVolil07guHPvOW8mGRcvxa5' AS result;
+ SELECT crypt('a very much longer text to encrypt.  This one even stretches over more'
+     'than one line.', '$5$rounds=1400$anotherlongsaltstring')
+            = '$5$rounds=1400$anotherlongsalts$Rx.j8H.h8HjEDGomFU8bDkXm3XIUnzyxf12oP84Bnq1' AS result;
+SELECT crypt('we have a short salt string but not a short password', '$5$rounds=77777$short')
+           = '$5$rounds=77777$short$JiO1O3ZpDAxGJeaDIuqCoEFysAe1mZNJRs3pw0KQRd/' AS result;
+SELECT crypt('a short string', '$5$rounds=123456$asaltof16chars..')
+           = '$5$rounds=123456$asaltof16chars..$gP3VQ/6X7UUEW3HkBn2w1/Ptq2jxPyzV/cZKmF/wJvD' AS result;
+SELECT crypt('the minimum number is still observed', '$5$rounds=10$roundstoolow')
+           = '$5$rounds=1000$roundstoolow$yfvwcWrQ8l/K0DAWyuPMDNHpIVlTQebY9l/gL972bIC' AS result;
+
+-- The following tests sha512crypt (magic byte $6$ with salt and rounds)
+SELECT crypt('Hello world!', '$6$saltstring')
+           = '$6$saltstring$svn8UoSVapNtMuq1ukKS4tPQd8iKwSMHWjl/O817G3uBnIFNjnQJuesI68u4OTLiBFdcbYEdFCoEOfaS35inz1' AS result;
+SELECT crypt('Hello world!', '$6$rounds=10000$saltstringsaltstring')
+           = '$6$rounds=10000$saltstringsaltst$OW1/O6BYHV6BcXZu8QVeXbDWra3Oeqh0sbHbbMCVNSnCM/UrjmM0Dp8vOuZeHBy/YTBmSK6H9qs/y3RnOaw5v.' AS result;
+SELECT crypt('This is just a test', '$6$rounds=5000$toolongsaltstring')
+           = '$6$rounds=5000$toolongsaltstrin$lQ8jolhgVRVhY4b5pZKaysCLi0QBxGoNeKQzQ3glMhwllF7oGDZxUhx1yxdYcz/e1JSbq3y6JMxxl8audkUEm0' AS result;
+SELECT crypt('a very much longer text to encrypt.  This one even stretches over more'
+                 'than one line.', '$6$rounds=1400$anotherlongsaltstring')
+           = '$6$rounds=1400$anotherlongsalts$POfYwTEok97VWcjxIiSOjiykti.o/pQs.wPvMxQ6Fm7I6IoYN3CmLs66x9t0oSwbtEW7o7UmJEiDwGqd8p4ur1' AS result;
+SELECT crypt('we have a short salt string but not a short password', '$6$rounds=77777$short')
+           = '$6$rounds=77777$short$WuQyW2YR.hBNpjjRhpYD/ifIw05xdfeEyQoMxIXbkvr0gge1a1x3yRULJ5CCaUeOxFmtlcGZelFl5CxtgfiAc0' AS result;
+SELECT crypt('a short string', '$6$rounds=123456$asaltof16chars..')
+           = '$6$rounds=123456$asaltof16chars..$BtCwjqMJGx5hrJhZywWvt0RLE8uZ4oPwcelCjmw2kSYu.Ec6ycULevoBK25fs2xXgMNrCzIMVcgEJAstJeonj1' AS result;
+SELECT crypt('the minimum number is still observed', '$6$rounds=10$roundstoolow')
+           = '$6$rounds=1000$roundstoolow$kUMsbe306n21p9R.FRkW3IGn.S9NPN0x50YhH1xhLsPuWGsUSklZt58jaTfF4ZEQpyUNGc0dqbpBYYBaHHrsX.' AS result;
+
+-- cleanup
+DROP TABLE ctest;
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
index 396c67f0cde..281d9859b54 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/pgcrypto.sgml
@@ -189,6 +189,29 @@ hmac(data bytea, key bytea, type text) returns bytea
       <entry>13</entry>
       <entry>Original UNIX crypt</entry>
      </row>
+     <row>
+      <entry><literal>sha256crypt</literal></entry>
+      <entry>unlimited</entry>
+      <entry>yes</entry>
+      <entry>up to 32</entry>
+      <entry>80</entry>
+      <entry>Adapted from publicly available reference implementation
+       <ulink url="https://www.akkadia.org/drepper/SHA-crypt.txt">Unix crypt using SHA-256 and SHA-512
+       </ulink>
+      </entry>
+     </row>
+     <row>
+      <entry><literal>sha512crypt</literal></entry>
+      <entry>unlimited</entry>
+      <entry>yes</entry>
+      <entry>up to 32</entry>
+      <entry>123</entry>
+      <entry>Adapted from publicly available reference implementation
+       <ulink url="https://www.akkadia.org/drepper/SHA-crypt.txt">Unix crypt using SHA-256 and SHA-512
+       </ulink>
+      </entry>
+     </row>
+
     </tbody>
    </tgroup>
   </table>
@@ -245,7 +268,9 @@ gen_salt(type text [, iter_count integer ]) returns text
    <para>
     The <parameter>type</parameter> parameter specifies the hashing algorithm.
     The accepted types are: <literal>des</literal>, <literal>xdes</literal>,
-    <literal>md5</literal> and <literal>bf</literal>.
+    <literal>md5</literal>, <literal>bf</literal>, <literal>sha256crypt</literal> and
+    <literal>sha512crypt</literal>. The last two, <literal>sha256crypt</literal> and
+    <literal>sha512crypt</literal> are modern <literal>SHA-2</literal> based password hashes.
    </para>
 
    <para>
@@ -284,6 +309,12 @@ gen_salt(type text [, iter_count integer ]) returns text
        <entry>4</entry>
        <entry>31</entry>
       </row>
+      <row>
+       <entry><literal>sha256crypt, sha512crypt</literal></entry>
+       <entry>5000</entry>
+       <entry>1000</entry>
+       <entry>999999999</entry>
+      </row>
      </tbody>
     </tgroup>
    </table>
@@ -313,6 +344,15 @@ gen_salt(type text [, iter_count integer ]) returns text
     <function>gen_salt</function>.
    </para>
 
+   <para>
+   The default <parameter>iter_count</parameter> for <literal>sha256crypt</literal> and
+   <literal>sha512crypt</literal> of <literal>5000</literal> is considered too low for modern
+   hardware, but can be adjusted to generate stronger password hashes. Currently the generated hash
+   string always includes the <parameter>rounds</parameter> even when just the default is used.
+   Otherwise both hashes, <literal>sha256crypt</literal> and <literal>sha512crypt</literal> are
+   considered safe.
+   </para>
+
    <table id="pgcrypto-hash-speed-table">
     <title>Hash Algorithm Speeds</title>
     <tgroup cols="5">
-- 
2.48.1

