From 5db9fbc12897b28d216a1480cd529f0158525a37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Gustafsson Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:52:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH v35 1/9] nss: Support libnss as TLS library in libpq This commit contains the frontend and backend portion of TLS support in libpq to allow encrypted connections using NSS. The implementation is done as a drop-in replacement for the OpenSSL support and leverages the same internal API for abstracting library specific details. A new GUC, ssl_database, is used to identify the NSS database used for the serverside certificates and keys. The existing certificate and key GUCs are used for providing certificate and key nicknames. Client side there is a new connection parameter, cert_database, to identify the client cert and key. All existing sslmodes are supported in the same way as with OpenSSL. Authors: Daniel Gustafsson, Andrew Dunstan, Jacob Champion Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier --- src/include/common/nss.h | 52 + src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 10 +- src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 1 + src/include/pg_config_manual.h | 2 +- src/backend/libpq/auth.c | 6 + src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c | 1385 +++++++++++++++++ src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c | 1 + src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 18 +- src/common/cipher_nss.c | 192 +++ src/common/protocol_nss.c | 59 + src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 4 + src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c | 1080 +++++++++++++ src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c | 21 + src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h | 11 + src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h | 29 +- .../postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out | 2 +- 16 files changed, 2868 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/include/common/nss.h create mode 100644 src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c create mode 100644 src/common/cipher_nss.c create mode 100644 src/common/protocol_nss.c create mode 100644 src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c diff --git a/src/include/common/nss.h b/src/include/common/nss.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3385429f91 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/include/common/nss.h @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/*------------------------------------------------------------------------- + * + * nss.h + * NSS supporting functionality shared between frontend and backend + * + * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group + * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California + * + * IDENTIFICATION + * src/include/common/nss.h + * + *------------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ +#ifndef COMMON_NSS_H +#define COMMON_NSS_H + +#ifdef USE_NSS + +/* + * BITS_PER_BYTE is also defined in the NSPR header files, so we need to undef + * our version to avoid compiler warnings on redefinition. + */ +#define pg_BITS_PER_BYTE BITS_PER_BYTE +#undef BITS_PER_BYTE +/* + * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with + * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error. + * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this. + */ +#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* src/common/cipher_nss.c */ +bool pg_find_cipher(char *name, PRUint16 *cipher); +bool pg_find_signature_algorithm(SECOidTag signature, SECOidTag *digest, int *len); + +/* src/common/protocol_nss.c */ +char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int version); + +#endif /* USE_NSS */ + +#endif /* COMMON_NSS_H */ diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h index 713c34fedd..3507085a44 100644 --- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h +++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h @@ -206,6 +206,10 @@ typedef struct Port SSL *ssl; X509 *peer; #endif + +#ifdef USE_NSS + void *pr_fd; +#endif } Port; #ifdef USE_SSL @@ -288,7 +292,7 @@ extern void be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len); * This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have * the X509_get_signature_nid() function. */ -#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID) +#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)) #define HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len); #endif @@ -298,6 +302,10 @@ extern char *be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len); typedef void (*openssl_tls_init_hook_typ) (SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart); extern PGDLLIMPORT openssl_tls_init_hook_typ openssl_tls_init_hook; #endif +#ifdef USE_NSS +typedef void (*nss_tls_init_hook_type) (bool isServerStart); +extern PGDLLIMPORT nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook; +#endif #endif /* USE_SSL */ diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h index 3ebbc8d665..15bb3c5d77 100644 --- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h +++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h @@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload; #ifdef USE_SSL extern bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations; #endif +extern char *ssl_database; extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart); extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void); diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h index e28c990382..d839738213 100644 --- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h +++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ * USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL * implementation. */ -#ifdef USE_OPENSSL +#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_NSS) #define USE_SSL #endif diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c index 9dc28e19aa..ba4321353e 100644 --- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c +++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c @@ -2802,7 +2802,13 @@ CheckCertAuth(Port *port) int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR; char *peer_username = NULL; +#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) Assert(port->ssl); +#elif defined(USE_NSS) + Assert(port->pr_fd); +#else + Assert(false); +#endif /* select the correct field to compare */ switch (port->hba->clientcertname) diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d2222a680f --- /dev/null +++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c @@ -0,0 +1,1385 @@ +/*------------------------------------------------------------------------- + * + * be-secure-nss.c + * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend + * + * + * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group + * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California + * + * IDENTIFICATION + * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-nss.c + * + *------------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + +#include "postgres.h" + +#include + +#include "common/nss.h" + +/* + * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with + * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error. + * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this. + */ +#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "lib/stringinfo.h" +#include "libpq/libpq.h" +#include "nodes/pg_list.h" +#include "miscadmin.h" +#include "storage/fd.h" +#include "utils/guc.h" +#include "utils/memutils.h" + + +/* default init hook can be overridden by a shared library */ +static void default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart); +nss_tls_init_hook_type nss_tls_init_hook = default_nss_tls_init; + +static PRDescIdentity pr_id; + +static PRIOMethods pr_iomethods; +static NSSInitContext *nss_context = NULL; +static SSLVersionRange desired_sslver; + +static char *external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg); +static SECStatus pg_SSLShutdownFunc(void *private_data, void *nss_data); +static bool dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = false; +static bool ssl_is_server_start; + +/* + * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the + * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather + * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation: + * + * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's + * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because + * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's + * strong commitment to backward compatibility." + * + * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket + * + * The function is declared in , but as it is a header marked + * private we declare it here rather than including it. + */ +NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int); + +/* NSS IO layer callback overrides */ +static PRStatus pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd); +/* Utility functions */ +static PRFileDesc *init_iolayer(Port *port); +static uint16 ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v); + +static char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode); +static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, + PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer); +static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd); +static char *dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg); + +/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */ +/* Public interface */ +/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */ + +/* + * be_tls_init + * Initialize the nss TLS library in the postmaster + * + * The majority of the setup needs to happen in be_tls_open_server since the + * NSPR initialization must happen after the forking of the backend. We could + * potentially move some parts in under !isServerStart, but so far this is the + * separation chosen. + */ +int +be_tls_init(bool isServerStart) +{ + SECStatus status; + SSLVersionRange supported_sslver; + + status = SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt(0, 0, NULL, 1, 0, 0, PR_FALSE); + if (status != SECSuccess) + { + ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG, + (errmsg("unable to connect to TLS connection cache: %s", + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())))); + return -1; + } + + if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0) + { + ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG, + (errmsg("no certificate database specified"))); + return -1; + } + + /* + * We check for the desired TLS version range here, even though we cannot + * set it until be_open_server such that we can be compatible with how the + * OpenSSL backend reports errors for incompatible range configurations. + * Set either the default supported TLS version range, or the configured + * range from ssl_min_protocol_version and ssl_max_protocol version. In + * case the user hasn't defined the maximum allowed version we fall back + * to the highest version TLS that the library supports. + */ + if (SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported_sslver) != SECSuccess) + { + ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG, + (errmsg("unable to get default protocol support from NSS"))); + return -1; + } + + /* + * Set the fallback versions for the TLS protocol version range to a + * combination of our minimal requirement and the library maximum. Error + * messages should be kept identical to those in be-secure-openssl.c to + * make translations easier. + */ + desired_sslver.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0; + desired_sslver.max = supported_sslver.max; + + if (ssl_min_protocol_version) + { + int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_min_protocol_version); + + if (ver == -1) + { + ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG, + (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build", + "ssl_min_protocol_version", + GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version", + false, false)))); + return -1; + } + + if (ver > 0) + desired_sslver.min = ver; + } + + if (ssl_max_protocol_version) + { + int ver = ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(ssl_max_protocol_version); + + if (ver == -1) + { + ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG, + (errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build", + "ssl_max_protocol_version", + GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version", + false, false)))); + return -1; + } + if (ver > 0) + desired_sslver.max = ver; + + if (ver < desired_sslver.min) + { + ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG, + (errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"), + errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"", + "ssl_min_protocol_version", + "ssl_max_protocol_version"))); + return -1; + } + } + + /* + * Set the passphrase callback which will be used both to obtain the + * passphrase from the user, as well as by NSS to obtain the phrase + * repeatedly. + */ + ssl_is_server_start = isServerStart; + (*nss_tls_init_hook) (isServerStart); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * be_tls_open_server + * + * Since NSPR initialization must happen after forking, most of the actual + * setup of NSPR/NSS is done here rather than in be_tls_init. This introduce + * differences with the OpenSSL support where some errors are only reported + * at runtime with NSS where they are reported at startup with OpenSSL. + */ +int +be_tls_open_server(Port *port) +{ + SECStatus status; + PRFileDesc *model; + PRFileDesc *layer; + CERTCertificate *server_cert; + SECKEYPrivateKey *private_key; + CERTSignedCrl *crl; + SECItem crlname; + char *cert_database; + NSSInitParameters params; + + /* + * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init + * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the + * initialization implicitly. The documentation doesn't however clarify + * from which version this is holds true, so let's perform the potentially + * superfluous initialization anyways to avoid crashing on older versions + * of NSPR, as there is no difference in overhead. The NSS documentation + * still states that PR_Init must be called in some way (implicitly or + * explicitly). + * + * The below parameters are what the implicit initialization would've done + * for us, and should work even for older versions where it might not be + * done automatically. The last parameter, maxPTDs, is set to various + * values in other codebases, but has been unused since NSPR 2.1 which was + * released sometime in 1998. In current versions of NSPR all parameters + * are ignored. + */ + PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0 /* maxPTDs */ ); + + /* + * The certificate path (configdir) must contain a valid NSS database. If + * the certificate path isn't a valid directory, NSS will fall back on the + * system certificate database. If the certificate path is a directory but + * is empty then the initialization will fail. On the client side this can + * be allowed for any sslmode but the verify-xxx ones. + * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=728562 For the server side + * we won't allow this to fail however, as we require the certificate and + * key to exist. + * + * The original design of NSS was for a single application to use a single + * copy of it, initialized with NSS_Initialize() which isn't returning any + * handle with which to refer to NSS. NSS initialization and shutdown are + * global for the application, so a shutdown in another NSS enabled + * library would cause NSS to be stopped for libpq as well. The fix has + * been to introduce NSS_InitContext which returns a context handle to + * pass to NSS_ShutdownContext. NSS_InitContext was introduced in NSS + * 3.12, but the use of it is not very well documented. + * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738456 + * + * The InitParameters struct passed can be used to override internal + * values in NSS, but the usage is not documented at all. When using + * NSS_Init initializations, the values are instead set via PK11_Configure + * calls so the PK11_Configure documentation can be used to glean some + * details on these. + * + * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11/Module_Specs + */ + memset(¶ms, '\0', sizeof(params)); + params.length = sizeof(params); + + if (!ssl_database || strlen(ssl_database) == 0) + ereport(FATAL, + (errmsg("no certificate database specified"))); + + cert_database = psprintf("sql:%s", ssl_database); + nss_context = NSS_InitContext(cert_database, "", "", "", + ¶ms, + NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD); + pfree(cert_database); + + if (!nss_context) + ereport(FATAL, + (errmsg("unable to read certificate database \"%s\": %s", + ssl_database, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())))); + + /* + * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions + * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works + * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API, + * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using + * it. + */ + port->pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(port->sock); + if (!port->pr_fd) + { + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errmsg("unable to connect to socket"))); + return -1; + } + + /* + * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR + * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it + * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which + * copes with IPv6 as well. + * + * We use a model filedescriptor here which is a construct in NSPR/NSS in + * order to create a configuration template for sockets which can then be + * applied to new sockets created. This makes more sense in a server which + * accepts multiple connections and want to perform the boilerplate just + * once, but it does provide a nice abstraction here as well in that we + * can error out early without having performed any operation on the real + * socket. + */ + model = PR_OpenTCPSocket(port->laddr.addr.ss_family); + if (!model) + { + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errmsg("unable to open socket"))); + return -1; + } + + /* + * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this + * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on + * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk + * of silent downgrades. + */ + model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model); + if (!model) + { + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errmsg("unable to enable TLS on socket"))); + return -1; + } + + /* + * Configure basic settings for the connection over the SSL socket in + * order to set it up as a server. + */ + if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess) + { + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection"))); + return -1; + } + + if (SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess || + SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess) + { + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errmsg("unable to configure TLS connection as server"))); + return -1; + } + + /* + * SSLv2 is disabled by default, and SSLv3 will be excluded from the range + * of allowed protocols further down. Since we really don't want these to + * ever be enabled, let's use belts and suspenders and explicitly turn + * them off as well. + */ + SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE); + SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE); + +#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV + + /* + * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS server has + * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1 + * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as + * an NSS environment variable. + */ + SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE); +#endif + + /* + * Configure the allowed ciphers. If there are no user preferred suites, + * set the domestic policy. + * + * Historically there were different cipher policies based on export (and + * import) restrictions: Domestic, Export and France. These are since long + * removed with all ciphers being enabled by default. Due to backwards + * compatibility, the old API is still used even though all three policies + * now do the same thing. + * + * If SSLCipherSuites define a policy of the user, we set that rather than + * enabling all ciphers via NSS_SetDomesticPolicy. + * + * TODO: while this code works, the set of ciphers which can be set and + * still end up with a working socket is woefully underdocumented for + * anything more recent than SSLv3 (the code for TLS actually calls ssl3 + * functions under the hood for SSL_CipherPrefSet), so it's unclear if + * this is helpful or not. Using the policies works, but may be too + * coarsely grained. + * + * Another TODO: The SSL_ImplementedCiphers table returned with calling + * SSL_GetImplementedCiphers is sorted in server preference order. Sorting + * SSLCipherSuites according to the order of the ciphers therein could be + * a way to implement ssl_prefer_server_ciphers - if we at all want to use + * cipher selection for NSS like how we do it for OpenSSL that is. + */ + + /* + * If no ciphers are specified, enable them all. + */ + if (!SSLCipherSuites || strlen(SSLCipherSuites) == 0) + { + status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy(); + if (status != SECSuccess) + { + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errmsg("unable to set cipher policy: %s", + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())))); + return -1; + } + } + else + { + char *ciphers, + *c; + + char *sep = ":;, "; + PRUint16 ciphercode; + const PRUint16 *nss_ciphers; + bool found = false; + + /* + * If the user has specified a set of preferred cipher suites we start + * by turning off all the existing suites to avoid the risk of down- + * grades to a weaker cipher than expected. + */ + nss_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers(); + for (int i = 0; i < SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(); i++) + SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, nss_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE); + + ciphers = pstrdup(SSLCipherSuites); + + for (c = strtok(ciphers, sep); c; c = strtok(NULL, sep)) + { + if (pg_find_cipher(c, &ciphercode)) + { + status = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, ciphercode, PR_TRUE); + found = true; + if (status != SECSuccess) + { + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errmsg("invalid cipher-suite specified: %s", c))); + return -1; + } + } + } + + pfree(ciphers); + + if (!found) + { + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errmsg("no cipher-suites found"))); + return -1; + } + } + + if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_sslver) != SECSuccess) + { + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errmsg("unable to set requested SSL protocol version range"))); + return -1; + } + + /* + * Set up the custom IO layer in order to be able to provide custom call- + * backs for IO operations which override the built-in behavior. For now + * we need this in order to support debug builds of NSS/NSPR. + */ + layer = init_iolayer(port); + if (!layer) + return -1; + + if (PR_PushIOLayer(port->pr_fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, layer) != PR_SUCCESS) + { + PR_Close(layer); + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errmsg("unable to push IO layer"))); + return -1; + } + + server_cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(ssl_cert_file, (void *) port); + if (!server_cert) + { + if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called) + { + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errmsg("unable to load certificate for \"%s\": %s", + ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())), + errhint("The certificate requires a password."))); + return -1; + } + else + { + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errmsg("unable to find certificate for \"%s\": %s", + ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())))); + return -1; + } + } + + private_key = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(server_cert, (void *) port); + if (!private_key) + { + if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called) + { + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errmsg("unable to load private key for \"%s\": %s", + ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())), + errhint("The private key requires a password."))); + return -1; + } + else + { + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errmsg("unable to find private key for \"%s\": %s", + ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())))); + return -1; + } + } + + /* + * NSS doesn't use CRL files on disk, so we use the ssl_crl_file guc to + * contain the CRL nickname for the current server certificate in the NSS + * certificate database. The main difference from the OpenSSL backend is + * that NSS will use the CRL regardless, but being able to make sure the + * CRL is loaded seems like a good feature. + */ + if (ssl_crl_file[0]) + { + SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &crlname, &server_cert->derSubject); + crl = SEC_FindCrlByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &crlname, SEC_CRL_TYPE); + if (!crl) + { + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errmsg("specified CRL not found in database"))); + return -1; + } + SEC_DestroyCrl(crl); + } + + /* + * Finally we must configure the socket for being a server by setting the + * certificate and key. The NULL parameter is an SSLExtraServerCertData + * pointer with the final parameter being the size of the extra server + * cert data structure pointed to. This is typically only used for + * credential delegation. + */ + status = SSL_ConfigServerCert(model, server_cert, private_key, NULL, 0); + if (status != SECSuccess) + { + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errmsg("unable to configure server for TLS server connections: %s", + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())))); + return -1; + } + + ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true; + + /* + * At this point, we no longer have use for the certificate and private + * key as they have been copied into the context by NSS. Destroy our + * copies explicitly to clean out the memory as best we can. + */ + CERT_DestroyCertificate(server_cert); + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(private_key); + + /* Set up certificate authentication callback */ + status = SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) port); + if (status != SECSuccess) + { + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errmsg("unable to install authcert hook: %s", + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())))); + return -1; + } + SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) port); + SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, PR_TRUE); + SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE, PR_FALSE); + + /* + * Apply the configuration from the model template onto our actual socket + * to set it up as a TLS server. + */ + port->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, port->pr_fd); + if (!port->pr_fd) + { + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errmsg("unable to configure socket for TLS server mode: %s", + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())))); + return -1; + } + + /* + * The intention with the model FD is to keep it as a template for coming + * connections to amortize the cost and complexity across all client + * sockets. Since we won't get another socket connected in this backend + * we can however close the model immediately. + */ + PR_Close(model); + + /* + * Force a handshake on the next I/O request, the second parameter means + * that we are a server, PR_FALSE would indicate being a client. NSPR + * requires us to call SSL_ResetHandshake since we imported an already + * established socket. + */ + status = SSL_ResetHandshake(port->pr_fd, PR_TRUE); + if (status != SECSuccess) + { + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errmsg("unable to initiate handshake: %s", + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())))); + return -1; + } + status = SSL_ForceHandshake(port->pr_fd); + if (status != SECSuccess) + { + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errmsg("unable to handshake: %s", + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())))); + return -1; + } + + port->ssl_in_use = true; + + /* Register our shutdown callback */ + NSS_RegisterShutdown(pg_SSLShutdownFunc, port); + + return 0; +} + +ssize_t +be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor) +{ + ssize_t n_read; + PRErrorCode err; + + n_read = PR_Read(port->pr_fd, ptr, len); + + if (n_read < 0) + { + err = PR_GetError(); + + if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) + { + *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE; + errno = EWOULDBLOCK; + } + else + errno = ECONNRESET; + } + + return n_read; +} + +ssize_t +be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor) +{ + ssize_t n_write; + PRErrorCode err; + PRIntn flags = 0; + + /* + * The flags parameter to PR_Send is no longer used and is, according to + * the documentation, required to be zero. + */ + n_write = PR_Send(port->pr_fd, ptr, len, flags, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT); + + if (n_write < 0) + { + err = PR_GetError(); + + if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) + { + *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE; + errno = EWOULDBLOCK; + } + else + errno = ECONNRESET; + } + + return n_write; +} + +/* + * be_tls_close + * + * Callback for closing down the current connection, if any. + */ +void +be_tls_close(Port *port) +{ + if (!port) + return; + + if (port->peer_cn) + { + SSL_InvalidateSession(port->pr_fd); + pfree(port->peer_cn); + port->peer_cn = NULL; + } + + PR_Close(port->pr_fd); + port->pr_fd = NULL; + port->ssl_in_use = false; + + if (nss_context) + { + NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context); + nss_context = NULL; + } +} + +/* + * be_tls_destroy + * + * Callback for destroying global contexts during SIGHUP. + */ +void +be_tls_destroy(void) +{ + /* + * It reads a bit odd to clear a session cache when we are destroying the + * context altogether, but if the session cache isn't cleared before + * shutting down the context it will fail with SEC_ERROR_BUSY. + */ + SSL_ClearSessionCache(); +} + +/* + * be_tls_get_cipher_bits + * + */ +int +be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port) +{ + SECStatus status; + SSLChannelInfo channel; + SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite; + + status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel)); + if (status != SECSuccess) + goto error; + + status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite)); + if (status != SECSuccess) + goto error; + + return suite.effectiveKeyBits; + +error: + ereport(WARNING, + (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s", + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())))); + return 0; +} + +/* + * be_tls_get_version + * + * Returns the protocol version used for the current connection, or NULL in + * case of errors. + */ +const char * +be_tls_get_version(Port *port) +{ + SECStatus status; + SSLChannelInfo channel; + + status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel)); + if (status != SECSuccess) + { + ereport(WARNING, + (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s", + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())))); + return NULL; + } + + return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion); +} + +/* + * be_tls_get_cipher + * + * Returns the cipher used for the current connection. + */ +const char * +be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port) +{ + SECStatus status; + SSLChannelInfo channel; + SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite; + + status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(port->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel)); + if (status != SECSuccess) + goto error; + + status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite)); + if (status != SECSuccess) + goto error; + + return suite.cipherSuiteName; + +error: + ereport(WARNING, + (errmsg("unable to extract TLS session information: %s", + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())))); + return NULL; +} + +/* + * be_tls_get_peer_subject_name + * + * Returns the subject name of the peer certificate. + */ +void +be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len) +{ + CERTCertificate *certificate; + + certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd); + if (certificate) + strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->subject), len); + else + ptr[0] = '\0'; +} + +/* + * be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name + * + * Returns the issuer name of the peer certificate. + */ +void +be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len) +{ + CERTCertificate *certificate; + + certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd); + if (certificate) + strlcpy(ptr, CERT_NameToAscii(&certificate->issuer), len); + else + ptr[0] = '\0'; +} + +/* + * be_tls_get_peer_serial + * + * Returns the serial of the peer certificate. + */ +void +be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len) +{ + CERTCertificate *certificate; + + certificate = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd); + if (certificate) + snprintf(ptr, len, "%li", DER_GetInteger(&(certificate->serialNumber))); + else + ptr[0] = '\0'; +} + +/* + * be_tls_get_certificate_hash + * + * Returns the hash data of the server certificate for SCRAM channel binding. + */ +char * +be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len) +{ + CERTCertificate *certificate; + SECOidTag signature_tag; + SECOidTag digest_alg; + int digest_len; + SECStatus status; + PLArenaPool *arena = NULL; + SECItem digest; + char *ret; + PK11Context *ctx = NULL; + unsigned int outlen; + + *len = 0; + certificate = SSL_LocalCertificate(port->pr_fd); + if (!certificate) + return NULL; + + signature_tag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&certificate->signature); + if (!pg_find_signature_algorithm(signature_tag, &digest_alg, &digest_len)) + elog(ERROR, "could not find digest for OID '%s'", + SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_tag)); + + /* + * The TLS server's certificate bytes need to be hashed with SHA-256 if + * its signature algorithm is MD5 or SHA-1 as per RFC 5929 + * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5929#section-4.1). If something else + * is used, the same hash as the signature algorithm is used. + */ + if (digest_alg == SEC_OID_SHA1 || digest_alg == SEC_OID_MD5) + { + digest_alg = SEC_OID_SHA256; + digest_len = SHA256_LENGTH; + } + + ctx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(digest_alg); + if (!ctx) + elog(ERROR, "out of memory"); + + arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE); + digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len); + digest.len = digest_len; + + status = SECSuccess; + status |= PK11_DigestBegin(ctx); + status |= PK11_DigestOp(ctx, certificate->derCert.data, certificate->derCert.len); + status |= PK11_DigestFinal(ctx, digest.data, &outlen, digest_len); + + if (status != SECSuccess) + { + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE); + PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE); + elog(ERROR, "could not generate server certificate hash"); + } + + ret = palloc(digest.len); + memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len); + *len = digest_len; + + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE); + PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE); + + return ret; +} + +/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */ +/* Internal functions */ +/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */ + +/* + * default_nss_tls_init + * + * The default TLS init hook function which users can override for installing + * their own passphrase callbacks and similar actions. In case no callback has + * been configured, or the callback isn't reload capable during a server + * reload, the dummy callback will be installed. + * + * The private data for the callback is set differently depending on how it's + * invoked. For calls which may invoke the callback deeper in the callstack + * the private data is set with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg. When the call is directly + * invoking the callback, like PK11_FindCertFromNickname, then the private + * data is passed as a parameter. Setting the data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg is + * thus not required but good practice. + * + * NSS doesn't provide a default callback like OpenSSL does, but a callback is + * required to be set. The password callback can be installed at any time, but + * setting the private data with SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg requires a PR Filedesc. + */ +static void +default_nss_tls_init(bool isServerStart) +{ + /* + * No user-defined callback has been configured, install the dummy call- + * back since we must set something. + */ + if (!ssl_passphrase_command[0]) + PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb); + else + { + /* + * There is a user-defined callback, set it unless we are in a restart + * and cannot handle restarts due to an interactive callback. + */ + if (isServerStart) + PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb); + else + { + if (ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload) + PK11_SetPasswordFunc(external_ssl_passphrase_cb); + else + PK11_SetPasswordFunc(dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb); + } + } +} + +/* + * external_ssl_passphrase_cb + * + * Runs the callback configured by ssl_passphrase_command and returns the + * captured password back to NSS. + */ +static char * +external_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg) +{ + /* + * NSS use a hardcoded 256 byte buffer for reading the password so set the + * same limit for our callback buffer. + */ + char buf[256]; + int len; + char *password = NULL; + char *prompt; + + /* + * Since there is no password callback in NSS when the server starts up, + * it makes little sense to create an interactive callback. Thus, if this + * is a retry attempt then give up immediately. + */ + if (retry) + return NULL; + + /* + * Construct the same prompt that NSS uses internally even though it is + * unlikely to serve much purpose, but we must set a prompt so we might as + * well do it right. + */ + prompt = psprintf("Enter Password or Pin for \"%s\":", + PK11_GetTokenName(slot)); + + len = run_ssl_passphrase_command(prompt, ssl_is_server_start, buf, sizeof(buf)); + pfree(prompt); + + if (!len) + return NULL; + + /* + * At least one byte with password content was returned, and NSS requires + * that we return it allocated in NSS controlled memory. If we fail to + * allocate then abort without passing back NULL and bubble up the error + * on the PG side. + */ + password = (char *) PR_Malloc(len + 1); + if (!password) + { + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); + ereport(ERROR, + (errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY), + errmsg("out of memory"))); + } + strlcpy(password, buf, sizeof(password)); + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); + + return password; +} + +/* + * dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb + * + * Return unsuccessful if we are asked to provide the passphrase for a cert or + * key, without having a passphrase callback installed. + */ +static char * +dummy_ssl_passphrase_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg) +{ + dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = true; + return NULL; +} + +/* + * pg_bad_cert_handler + * + * Callback for handling certificate validation failure during handshake. It's + * called from SSL_AuthCertificate during failure cases. + */ +static SECStatus +pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + Port *port = (Port *) arg; + + port->peer_cert_valid = false; + return SECFailure; +} + +/* + * raw_subject_common_name + * + * Returns the Subject Common Name for the given certificate as a raw char + * buffer (that is, without any form of escaping for unprintable characters or + * embedded nulls), with the length of the buffer returned in the len param. + * The buffer is allocated in the TopMemoryContext and is given a NULL + * terminator so that callers are safe to call strlen() on it. + * + * This is used instead of CERT_GetCommonName(), which always performs quoting + * and/or escaping. NSS doesn't appear to give us a way to easily unescape the + * result, and we need to store the raw CN into port->peer_cn for compatibility + * with the OpenSSL implementation. + */ +static char * +raw_subject_common_name(CERTCertificate *cert, unsigned int *len) +{ + CERTName subject = cert->subject; + CERTRDN **rdn; + + for (rdn = subject.rdns; *rdn; rdn++) + { + CERTAVA **ava; + + for (ava = (*rdn)->avas; *ava; ava++) + { + SECItem *buf; + char *cn; + + if (CERT_GetAVATag(*ava) != SEC_OID_AVA_COMMON_NAME) + continue; + + /* Found a CN, decode and copy it into a newly allocated buffer */ + buf = CERT_DecodeAVAValue(&(*ava)->value); + if (!buf) + { + /* + * This failure case is difficult to test. (Since this code + * runs after certificate authentication has otherwise + * succeeded, you'd need to convince a CA implementation to + * sign a corrupted certificate in order to get here.) + * + * Follow the behavior of CERT_GetCommonName() in this case and + * simply return NULL, as if a Common Name had not been found. + */ + goto fail; + } + + cn = MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, buf->len + 1); + memcpy(cn, buf->data, buf->len); + cn[buf->len] = '\0'; + + *len = buf->len; + + SECITEM_FreeItem(buf, PR_TRUE); + return cn; + } + } + +fail: + /* Not found. */ + *len = 0; + return NULL; +} + +/* + * pg_cert_auth_handler + * + * Callback for validation of incoming certificates. Returning SECFailure will + * cause NSS to terminate the connection immediately. + */ +static SECStatus +pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer) +{ + SECStatus status; + Port *port = (Port *) arg; + CERTCertificate *cert; + char *peer_cn; + unsigned int len; + + status = SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), port->pr_fd, checksig, PR_TRUE); + if (status != SECSuccess) + return status; + + port->peer_cn = NULL; + port->peer_cert_valid = false; + + cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(port->pr_fd); + if (!cert) + { + /* Shouldn't be possible; why did we get a client cert callback? */ + Assert(cert != NULL); + + PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, 0); + return SECFailure; + } + + peer_cn = raw_subject_common_name(cert, &len); + if (!peer_cn) + { + /* No Common Name, but the certificate otherwise checks out. */ + port->peer_cert_valid = true; + + status = SECSuccess; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Reject embedded NULLs in certificate common name to prevent attacks like + * CVE-2009-4034. + */ + if (len != strlen(peer_cn)) + { + ereport(COMMERROR, + (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION), + errmsg("SSL certificate's common name contains embedded null"))); + + pfree(peer_cn); + PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID, 0); + + status = SECFailure; + goto cleanup; + } + + port->peer_cn = peer_cn; + port->peer_cert_valid = true; + + status = SECSuccess; + +cleanup: + CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert); + return status; +} + +static PRStatus +pg_ssl_close(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + /* + * Disconnect our private Port from the fd before closing out the stack. + * (Debug builds of NSPR will assert if we do not.) + */ + fd->secret = NULL; + return PR_GetDefaultIOMethods()->close(fd); +} + +static PRFileDesc * +init_iolayer(Port *port) +{ + const PRIOMethods *default_methods; + PRFileDesc *layer; + + /* + * Start by initializing our layer with all the default methods so that we + * can selectively override the ones we want while still ensuring that we + * have a complete layer specification. + */ + default_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods(); + memcpy(&pr_iomethods, default_methods, sizeof(PRIOMethods)); + + pr_iomethods.close = pg_ssl_close; + + /* + * Each IO layer must be identified by a unique name, where uniqueness is + * per connection. Each connection in a postgres cluster can generate the + * identity from the same string as they will create their IO layers on + * different sockets. Only one layer per socket can have the same name. + */ + pr_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("PostgreSQL Server"); + if (pr_id == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER) + { + ereport(ERROR, + (errmsg("out of memory when setting up TLS connection"))); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * Create the actual IO layer as a stub such that it can be pushed onto + * the layer stack. The step via a stub is required as we define custom + * callbacks. + */ + layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(pr_id, &pr_iomethods); + if (!layer) + { + ereport(ERROR, + (errmsg("unable to create NSS I/O layer"))); + return NULL; + } + + /* Store the Port as private data available in callbacks */ + layer->secret = (void *) port; + + return layer; +} + +/* + * ssl_protocol_version_to_nss + * Translate PostgreSQL TLS version to NSS version + * + * Returns zero in case the requested TLS version is undefined (PG_ANY) and + * should be set by the caller, or -1 on failure. + */ +static uint16 +ssl_protocol_version_to_nss(int v) +{ + switch (v) + { + /* + * There is no SSL_LIBRARY_ macro defined in NSS with the value + * zero, so we use this to signal the caller that the highest + * useful version should be set on the connection. + */ + case PG_TLS_ANY: + return 0; + + /* + * No guard is required here as there are no versions of NSS + * without support for TLS1. + */ + case PG_TLS1_VERSION: + return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0; + case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION: +#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 + return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1; +#else + break; +#endif + case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION: +#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 + return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2; +#else + break; +#endif + case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION: +#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 + return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; +#else + break; +#endif + default: + break; + } + + return -1; +} + +/* + * pg_SSLerrmessage + * Create and return a human readable error message given + * the specified error code + * + * PR_ErrorToName only converts the enum identifier of the error to string, + * but that can be quite useful for debugging (and in case PR_ErrorToString is + * unable to render a message then we at least have something). + */ +static char * +pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode) +{ + return psprintf("%s (%s)", + PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT), + PR_ErrorToName(errcode)); +} + +/* + * pg_SSLShutdownFunc + * Callback for NSS shutdown + * + * If NSS is terminated from the outside when the connection is still in use + * we must treat this as potentially hostile and immediately close to avoid + * leaking the connection in any way. Once this is called, NSS will shutdown + * regardless so we may as well clean up the best we can. Returning SECFailure + * will cause the NSS shutdown to return with an error, but it will shutdown + * nevertheless. nss_data is reserved for future use and is always NULL. + */ +static SECStatus +pg_SSLShutdownFunc(void *private_data, void *nss_data) +{ + Port *port = (Port *) private_data; + + if (!port || !port->ssl_in_use) + return SECSuccess; + + /* + * There is a connection still open, close it and signal to whatever that + * called the shutdown that it was erroneous. + */ + be_tls_close(port); + be_tls_destroy(); + + return SECFailure; +} diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c index 8ef083200a..cf056f5364 100644 --- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c +++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload; #ifdef USE_SSL bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false; #endif +char *ssl_database; /* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */ char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL; diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c index c9c9da85f3..7a25f36cd1 100644 --- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c +++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c @@ -4370,7 +4370,11 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] = }, &ssl_library, #ifdef USE_SSL +#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) "OpenSSL", +#elif defined(USE_NSS) + "NSS", +#endif #else "", #endif @@ -4438,6 +4442,16 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] = check_canonical_path, assign_pgstat_temp_directory, NULL }, + { + {"ssl_database", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL, + gettext_noop("Location of the NSS certificate database."), + NULL + }, + &ssl_database, + "", + NULL, NULL, NULL + }, + { {"synchronous_standby_names", PGC_SIGHUP, REPLICATION_PRIMARY, gettext_noop("Number of synchronous standbys and list of names of potential synchronous ones."), @@ -4466,8 +4480,10 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] = GUC_SUPERUSER_ONLY }, &SSLCipherSuites, -#ifdef USE_OPENSSL +#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) "HIGH:MEDIUM:+3DES:!aNULL", +#elif defined (USE_NSS) + "", #else "none", #endif diff --git a/src/common/cipher_nss.c b/src/common/cipher_nss.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..30b32a7908 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/common/cipher_nss.c @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +/*------------------------------------------------------------------------- + * + * cipher_nss.c + * NSS functionality shared between frontend and backend for working + * with ciphers + * + * This should only be used if code is compiled with NSS support. + * + * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group + * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California + * + * IDENTIFICATION + * src/common/cipher_nss.c + * + *------------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + +#ifndef FRONTEND +#include "postgres.h" +#else +#include "postgres_fe.h" +#endif + +#include "common/nss.h" + +#define INVALID_CIPHER 0xFFFF + +typedef struct +{ + SECOidTag signature; + SECOidTag hash; + int len; +} NSSSignatureAlgorithm; + +static const NSSSignatureAlgorithm NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm[] = { + + {SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH}, + {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH}, + {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH}, + {SEC_OID_ISO_SHA1_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH}, + {SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH}, + + {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA224_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH}, + {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA224_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH}, + {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA224_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA224, SHA224_LENGTH}, + + {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH}, + {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH}, + {SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA256_DIGEST, SEC_OID_SHA256, SHA256_LENGTH}, + + {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH}, + {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA384, SHA384_LENGTH}, + + {SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA512_SIGNATURE, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH}, + {SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, SEC_OID_SHA512, SHA512_LENGTH}, + + {0, 0} +}; + +typedef struct +{ + const char *name; + PRUint16 number; +} NSSCiphers; + +/* + * This list is a partial copy of the ciphers in NSS files lib/ssl/sslproto.h + * in order to provide a human readable version of the ciphers. It would be + * nice to not have to have this, but NSS doesn't provide any API addressing + * the ciphers by name. TODO: do we want more of the ciphers, or perhaps less? + */ +static const NSSCiphers NSS_CipherList[] = { + + {"TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL", TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL}, + + {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5}, + {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA}, + {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5}, + {"TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA}, + {"TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA}, + + {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA}, + + {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA}, + + {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5}, + {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA}, + + {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA}, + + {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256}, + {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256}, + {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256}, + + {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256}, + {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA}, + + {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA}, + {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256}, + {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256}, + {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256}, + + {"TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA}, + {"TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA", TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA}, + + {"TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA", TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA}, + + {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256}, + {"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384}, + {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256}, + {"TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384}, + {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256}, + {"TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384}, + + {"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256}, + {"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384}, + {"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256}, + {NULL, 0} +}; + +/* + * pg_find_cipher + * Translate an NSS ciphername to the cipher code + * + * Searches the configured ciphers for the corresponding cipher code to the + * name. Search is performed case insensitive. + */ +bool +pg_find_cipher(char *name, PRUint16 *cipher) +{ + const NSSCiphers *cipher_list; + + for (cipher_list = NSS_CipherList; cipher_list->name; cipher_list++) + { + if (pg_strcasecmp(cipher_list->name, name) == 0) + { + *cipher = cipher_list->number; + return true; + } + } + + return false; +} + +bool +pg_find_signature_algorithm(SECOidTag signature, SECOidTag *algorithm, int *len) +{ + const NSSSignatureAlgorithm *candidate; + + candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm; + + for (candidate = NSS_SCRAMDigestAlgorithm; candidate->signature; candidate++) + { + if (signature == candidate->signature) + { + *algorithm = candidate->hash; + *len = candidate->len; + return true; + } + } + + return false; +} diff --git a/src/common/protocol_nss.c b/src/common/protocol_nss.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e8225a4d9d --- /dev/null +++ b/src/common/protocol_nss.c @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/*------------------------------------------------------------------------- + * + * protocol_nss.c + * NSS functionality shared between frontend and backend for working + * with protocols + * + * This should only be used if code is compiled with NSS support. + * + * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group + * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California + * + * IDENTIFICATION + * src/common/protocol_nss.c + * + *------------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + +#ifndef FRONTEND +#include "postgres.h" +#else +#include "postgres_fe.h" +#endif + +#include "common/nss.h" + +/* + * ssl_protocol_version_to_string + * Translate NSS TLS version to string + */ +char * +ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v) +{ + switch (v) + { + /* SSL v2 and v3 are not supported */ + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2: + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0: + Assert(false); + break; + + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0: + return pstrdup("TLSv1.0"); +#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1: + return pstrdup("TLSv1.1"); +#endif +#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2: + return pstrdup("TLSv1.2"); +#endif +#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3: + return pstrdup("TLSv1.3"); +#endif + } + + return pstrdup("unknown"); +} + diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c index 56a8266bc3..61d736fa7e 100644 --- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c +++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c @@ -341,6 +341,10 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = { "Target-Session-Attrs", "", 15, /* sizeof("prefer-standby") = 15 */ offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)}, + {"ssldatabase", NULL, NULL, NULL, + "CertificateDatabase", "", 64, + offsetof(struct pg_conn, ssldatabase)}, + /* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */ {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0} diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5f4eb31535 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c @@ -0,0 +1,1080 @@ +/*------------------------------------------------------------------------- + * + * fe-secure-nss.c + * functions for supporting NSS as a TLS backend for frontend libpq + * + * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group + * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California + * + * IDENTIFICATION + * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-nss.c + * + *------------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + +#include "postgres_fe.h" + +#include "libpq-fe.h" +#include "fe-auth.h" +#include "fe-secure-common.h" +#include "libpq-int.h" +#include "common/nss.h" + +/* + * The nspr/obsolete/protypes.h NSPR header typedefs uint64 and int64 with + * colliding definitions from ours, causing a much expected compiler error. + * Remove backwards compatibility with ancient NSPR versions to avoid this. + */ +#define NO_NSPR_10_SUPPORT +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static SECStatus pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule **module, const char *library, const char *name); +static SECStatus pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd); +static const char *pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode); +static SECStatus pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *socket, CERTDistNames *caNames, + CERTCertificate **pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey **pRetKey); +static SECStatus pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer); +static int ssl_protocol_param_to_nss(const char *protocol); +static bool certificate_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn); + +static char *PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg); + +/* + * PR_ImportTCPSocket() is a private API, but very widely used, as it's the + * only way to make NSS use an already set up POSIX file descriptor rather + * than opening one itself. To quote the NSS documentation: + * + * "In theory, code that uses PR_ImportTCPSocket may break when NSPR's + * implementation changes. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because + * NSPR's implementation has been stable for years and because of NSPR's + * strong commitment to backward compatibility." + * + * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSPR/Reference/PR_ImportTCPSocket + * + * The function is declared in , but as it is a header marked + * private we declare it here rather than including it. + */ +NSPR_API(PRFileDesc *) PR_ImportTCPSocket(int); + +static SECMODModule *ca_trust = NULL; + +/* + * This logic exists in NSS as well, but it's only available for when there is + * a database to open, and not only using the system trust store. Thus, we + * need to keep our own copy. + */ +#if defined(WIN32) +static const char *ca_trust_name = "nssckbi.dll"; +#elif defined(__darwin__) +static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.dylib"; +#else +static const char *ca_trust_name = "libnssckbi.so"; +#endif + +static PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQsslKeyPassHook = NULL; + +/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */ +/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */ +/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */ + +/* + * pgtls_init_library + * + * There is no direct equivalent for PQinitOpenSSL in NSS/NSPR, with PR_Init + * being the closest match there is. PR_Init is however already documented to + * not be required so simply making this a noop seems like the best option. + */ +void +pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto) +{ + /* noop */ +} + +int +pgtls_init(PGconn *conn, bool do_ssl, bool do_crypto) +{ + if (do_ssl) + { + conn->nss_context = NULL; + + conn->ssl_in_use = false; + conn->has_password = false; + } + + return 0; +} + +void +pgtls_close(PGconn *conn) +{ + if (conn->nss_context) + { + NSS_ShutdownContext(conn->nss_context); + conn->nss_context = NULL; + } +} + +PostgresPollingStatusType +pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn) +{ + SECStatus status; + PRFileDesc *model; + NSSInitParameters params; + SSLVersionRange desired_range; + + /* + * The NSPR documentation states that runtime initialization via PR_Init + * is no longer required, as the first caller into NSPR will perform the + * initialization implicitly. See be-secure-nss.c for further discussion + * on PR_Init. + */ + PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0); + + /* + * NSS initialization and the use of contexts is further discussed in + * be-secure-nss.c + */ + memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params)); + params.length = sizeof(params); + + if (conn->ssldatabase && strlen(conn->ssldatabase) > 0) + { + char *ssldatabase_path = psprintf("sql:%s", conn->ssldatabase); + + conn->nss_context = NSS_InitContext(ssldatabase_path, "", "", "", + ¶ms, + NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD); + pfree(ssldatabase_path); + + if (!conn->nss_context) + { + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("unable to open certificate database \"%s\": %s"), + conn->ssldatabase, + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())); + return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED; + } + } + else + { + conn->nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", ¶ms, + NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB | + NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN | + NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD); + if (!conn->nss_context) + { + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("unable to initialize NSS: %s"), + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())); + return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED; + } + } + + /* + * Configure cipher policy by setting the domestic suite. + * + * Historically there were different cipher policies based on export (and + * import) restrictions: Domestic, Export and France. These are since long + * removed with all ciphers being enabled by default. Due to backwards + * compatibility, the old API is still used even though all three policies + * now do the same thing. + */ + status = NSS_SetDomesticPolicy(); + if (status != SECSuccess) + { + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("unable to configure cipher policy: %s"), + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())); + + return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED; + } + + /* + * If we don't have a certificate database, the system trust store is the + * fallback we can use. If we fail to initialize that as well, we can + * still attempt a connection as long as the sslmode isn't verify-*. + */ + if (!conn->ssldatabase && + (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "verify-ca") == 0 || + strcmp(conn->sslmode, "verify-full") == 0)) + { + status = pg_load_nss_module(&ca_trust, ca_trust_name, "\"Root Certificates\""); + if (status != SECSuccess) + { + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("WARNING: unable to load system NSS trust module \"%s\", create a local NSS database and retry : %s"), + ca_trust_name, + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())); + + return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED; + } + } + + + PK11_SetPasswordFunc(PQssl_passwd_cb); + + /* + * Import the already opened socket as we don't want to use NSPR functions + * for opening the network socket due to how the PostgreSQL protocol works + * with TLS connections. This function is not part of the NSPR public API, + * see the comment at the top of the file for the rationale of still using + * it. + */ + conn->pr_fd = PR_ImportTCPSocket(conn->sock); + if (!conn->pr_fd) + { + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("unable to attach to socket: %s"), + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())); + return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED; + } + + /* + * Most of the documentation available, and implementations of, NSS/NSPR + * use the PR_NewTCPSocket() function here, which has the drawback that it + * can only create IPv4 sockets. Instead use PR_OpenTCPSocket() which + * copes with IPv6 as well. + */ + model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, PR_OpenTCPSocket(conn->laddr.addr.ss_family)); + if (!model) + { + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("unable to enable TLS: %s"), + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())); + return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED; + } + + /* Disable old protocol versions (SSLv2 and SSLv3) */ + SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, PR_FALSE); + SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, PR_FALSE); + SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE); + +#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV + + /* + * Enable protection against the BEAST attack in case the NSS library has + * support for that. While SSLv3 is disabled, we may still allow TLSv1 + * which is affected. The option isn't documented as an SSL option, but as + * an NSS environment variable. + */ + SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, PR_TRUE); +#endif + + /* Set us up as a TLS client for the handshake */ + SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE); + + /* + * When setting the available protocols, we either use the user defined + * configuration values, and if missing we accept whatever is the highest + * version supported by the library as the max and only limit the range in + * the other end at TLSv1.0. ssl_variant_stream is a ProtocolVariant enum + * for Stream protocols, rather than datagram. + */ + SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &desired_range); + desired_range.min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0; + + if (conn->ssl_min_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version) > 0) + { + int ssl_min_ver = ssl_protocol_param_to_nss(conn->ssl_min_protocol_version); + + if (ssl_min_ver == -1) + { + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for minimum version of SSL protocol\n"), + conn->ssl_min_protocol_version); + return -1; + } + + desired_range.min = ssl_min_ver; + } + + if (conn->ssl_max_protocol_version && strlen(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version) > 0) + { + int ssl_max_ver = ssl_protocol_param_to_nss(conn->ssl_max_protocol_version); + + if (ssl_max_ver == -1) + { + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("invalid value \"%s\" for maximum version of SSL protocol\n"), + conn->ssl_max_protocol_version); + return -1; + } + + desired_range.max = ssl_max_ver; + } + + if (SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &desired_range) != SECSuccess) + { + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("unable to set allowed SSL protocol version range: %s"), + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())); + return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED; + } + + /* + * Set up callback for verifying server certificates, as well as for how + * to handle failed verifications. + */ + SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, pg_cert_auth_handler, (void *) conn); + SSL_BadCertHook(model, pg_bad_cert_handler, (void *) conn); + + /* + * Convert the NSPR socket to an SSL socket. Ensuring the success of this + * operation is critical as NSS SSL_* functions may return SECSuccess on + * the socket even though SSL hasn't been enabled, which introduce a risk + * of silent downgrades. + */ + conn->pr_fd = SSL_ImportFD(model, conn->pr_fd); + if (!conn->pr_fd) + { + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("unable to configure client for TLS: %s"), + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())); + return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED; + } + + /* + * The model can now be closed as we've applied the settings of the model + * onto the real socket. From here on we should only use conn->pr_fd. + */ + PR_Close(model); + + /* Set the private data to be passed to the password callback */ + SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(conn->pr_fd, (void *) conn); + + status = SSL_ResetHandshake(conn->pr_fd, PR_FALSE); + if (status != SECSuccess) + { + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("unable to initiate handshake: %s"), + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())); + return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED; + } + + /* Set callback for client authentication when requested by the server */ + SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(conn->pr_fd, pg_client_auth_handler, (void *) conn); + + /* + * Specify which hostname we are expecting to talk to for the ClientHello + * SNI extension. + */ + SSL_SetURL(conn->pr_fd, (conn->connhost[conn->whichhost]).host); + + status = SSL_ForceHandshake(conn->pr_fd); + + if (status != SECSuccess) + { + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("SSL error: %s"), + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())); + return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED; + } + + conn->ssl_in_use = true; + return PGRES_POLLING_OK; +} + +ssize_t +pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len) +{ + PRInt32 nread; + PRErrorCode status; + int read_errno = 0; + + /* + * PR_Recv blocks until there is data to read or the timeout expires. We + * don't want to sit blocked here, so the timeout is turned off by using + * PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT which means "return immediately", Zero is returned + * for closed connections, while -1 indicates an error within the ongoing + * connection. + */ + nread = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT); + + if (nread == 0) + { + read_errno = ECONNRESET; + nread = -1; + } + else if (nread == -1) + { + status = PR_GetError(); + + switch (status) + { + case PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR: + /* No data available yet. */ + nread = 0; + break; + + case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR: + read_errno = EWOULDBLOCK; + break; + + /* + * The error cases for PR_Recv are not documented, but can be + * reverse engineered from _MD_unix_map_default_error() in the + * NSPR code, defined in pr/src/md/unix/unix_errors.c. + */ + case PR_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE_ERROR: + case PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR: + read_errno = ECONNRESET; + break; + + default: + break; + } + + if (nread == -1) + { + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("TLS read error: %s"), + pg_SSLerrmessage(status)); + } + } + + SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno); + return (ssize_t) nread; +} + +/* + * pgtls_read_pending + * Check for the existence of data to be read. + * + * This is part of the PostgreSQL TLS backend API. + */ +bool +pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn) +{ + unsigned char c; + int n; + + /* + * PR_Recv peeks into the stream with the timeount turned off, to see if + * there is another byte to read off the wire. There is an NSS function + * SSL_DataPending() which might seem like a better fit, but it will only + * check already encrypted data in the SSL buffer, not still unencrypted + * data, thus it doesn't guarantee that a subsequent call to + * PR_Read/PR_Recv won't block. + */ + n = PR_Recv(conn->pr_fd, &c, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT); + return (n > 0); +} + +ssize_t +pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len) +{ + PRInt32 n; + PRErrorCode status; + int write_errno = 0; + + n = PR_Write(conn->pr_fd, ptr, len); + + if (n < 0) + { + status = PR_GetError(); + + switch (status) + { + case PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR: +#ifdef EAGAIN + write_errno = EAGAIN; +#else + write_errno = EINTR; +#endif + break; + + default: + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("TLS write error: %s"), + pg_SSLerrmessage(status)); + write_errno = ECONNRESET; + break; + } + } + + SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno); + return (ssize_t) n; +} + +char * +pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len) +{ + CERTCertificate *server_cert; + SECOidTag signature_tag; + SECOidTag digest_alg; + int digest_len; + PLArenaPool *arena; + SECItem digest; + char *ret; + SECStatus status; + + *len = 0; + + server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd); + if (!server_cert) + return NULL; + + signature_tag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&server_cert->signature); + if (!pg_find_signature_algorithm(signature_tag, &digest_alg, &digest_len)) + { + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("could not find digest for OID '%s'\n"), + SECOID_FindOIDTagDescription(signature_tag)); + return NULL; + } + + arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE); + digest.data = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(unsigned char) * digest_len); + digest.len = digest_len; + + status = PK11_HashBuf(digest_alg, digest.data, server_cert->derCert.data, + server_cert->derCert.len); + + if (status != SECSuccess) + { + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("unable to generate peer certificate digest: %s"), + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())); + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE); + return NULL; + } + + ret = pg_malloc(digest.len); + memcpy(ret, digest.data, digest.len); + *len = digest_len; + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Verify that the server certificate matches the hostname we connected to. + * + * The certificate's Common Name and Subject Alternative Names are considered. + */ +int +pgtls_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_guts(PGconn *conn, + int *names_examined, + char **first_name) +{ + char *server_hostname = NULL; + CERTCertificate *server_cert = NULL; + SECStatus status = SECSuccess; + SECItem altname_item; + PLArenaPool *arena = NULL; + CERTGeneralName *san_list; + CERTGeneralName *cn; + + server_hostname = SSL_RevealURL(conn->pr_fd); + if (!server_hostname || server_hostname[0] == '\0') + goto done; + + /* + * CERT_VerifyCertName will internally perform RFC 2818 SubjectAltName + * verification. + */ + server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd); + status = CERT_VerifyCertName(server_cert, server_hostname); + if (status != SECSuccess) + { + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("unable to verify server hostname: %s"), + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())); + goto done; + } + + status = CERT_FindCertExtension(server_cert, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, + &altname_item); + if (status == SECSuccess) + { + arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (!arena) + { + status = SECFailure; + goto done; + } + san_list = CERT_DecodeAltNameExtension(arena, &altname_item); + if (!san_list) + { + status = SECFailure; + goto done; + } + + for (cn = san_list; cn != san_list; cn = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(cn)) + { + char *alt_name; + int rv; + char tmp[512]; + + status = CERT_RFC1485_EscapeAndQuote(tmp, sizeof(tmp), + (char *) cn->name.other.data, + cn->name.other.len); + + if (status != SECSuccess) + goto done; + + rv = pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate_name(conn, tmp, + strlen(tmp), + &alt_name); + if (alt_name) + { + if (!*first_name) + *first_name = alt_name; + else + free(alt_name); + } + + if (rv == 1) + status = SECSuccess; + else + { + status = SECFailure; + break; + } + } + } + else if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND) + status = SECSuccess; + else + status = SECSuccess; + +done: + /* san_list will be freed by freeing the arena it was allocated in */ + if (arena) + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE); + PR_Free(server_hostname); + + if (status == SECSuccess) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */ +/* PostgreSQL specific TLS support functions */ +/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */ + +static const char * +pg_SSLerrmessage(PRErrorCode errcode) +{ + const char *error; + + /* + * Try to get the user friendly error description, and if that fails try + * to fall back on the name of the PRErrorCode. + */ + error = PR_ErrorToString(errcode, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT); + if (!error) + error = PR_ErrorToName(errcode); + if (error) + return error; + + return "unknown TLS error"; +} + +static SECStatus +pg_load_nss_module(SECMODModule **module, const char *library, const char *name) +{ + SECMODModule *mod; + char *modulespec; + + modulespec = psprintf("library=\"%s\", name=\"%s\"", library, name); + + /* + * Attempt to load the specified module. The second parameter is "parent" + * which should always be NULL for application code. The third parameter + * defines if loading should recurse which is only applicable when loading + * a module from within another module. This hierarchy would have to be + * defined in the modulespec, and since we don't support anything but + * directly addressed modules we should pass PR_FALSE. + */ + mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(modulespec, NULL, PR_FALSE); + pfree(modulespec); + + if (mod && mod->loaded) + { + *module = mod; + return SECSuccess; + } + + SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */ +/* NSS Callbacks */ +/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */ + +/* + * pg_cert_auth_handler + * Callback for authenticating server certificate + * + * This is pretty much the same procedure as the SSL_AuthCertificate function + * provided by NSS, with the difference being server hostname validation. With + * SSL_AuthCertificate there is no way to do verify-ca, it only does the -full + * flavor of our sslmodes, so we need our own implementation. + */ +static SECStatus +pg_cert_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer) +{ + SECStatus status; + PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg; + CERTCertificate *server_cert; + void *pin; + + Assert(!isServer); + + pin = SSL_RevealPinArg(conn->pr_fd); + server_cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(conn->pr_fd); + + /* + * VerifyCertificateNow verifies the validity using PR_now from NSPR as a + * timestamp and will perform CRL and OSCP revocation checks. conn->sslcrl + * does not impact NSS connections as any CRL in the NSS database will be + * used automatically. + */ + status = CERT_VerifyCertificateNow((CERTCertDBHandle *) CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), + server_cert, + checksig, + certificateUsageSSLServer, + pin, + NULL); + + /* + * If we've already failed validation then there is no point in also + * performing the hostname check for verify-full. + */ + if (status == SECSuccess) + { + if (!pq_verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(conn)) + status = SECFailure; + } + else + { + printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("unable to verify certificate: %s"), + pg_SSLerrmessage(PR_GetError())); + } + + return status; +} + +/* + * pg_client_auth_handler + * Callback for client certificate validation + * + * The client auth callback is not on by default in NSS, so we need to invoke + * it ourselves to ensure we can do cert authentication. A TODO is to support + * running without a specified sslcert parameter. By retrieving all the certs + * via nickname from the cert database and see if we find one which apply with + * NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames() and PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert() we could support + * just running with a ssl database specified. + * + * For now, we use the default client certificate validation which requires a + * defined nickname to identify the cert in the database. + */ +static SECStatus +pg_client_auth_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *socket, CERTDistNames *caNames, + CERTCertificate **pRetCert, SECKEYPrivateKey **pRetKey) +{ + PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg; + + return NSS_GetClientAuthData(conn->sslcert, socket, caNames, pRetCert, pRetKey); +} + +/* + * pg_bad_cert_handler + * Callback for failed certificate validation + * + * The TLS handshake will call this function iff the server certificate failed + * validation. Depending on the sslmode, we allow the connection anyways. + */ +static SECStatus +pg_bad_cert_handler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg; + PRErrorCode err; + + /* + * This really shouldn't happen, as we've set the PGconn object as our + * callback data, and at the callsite we know it will be populated. That + * being said, the NSS code itself performs this check even when it should + * not be required so let's use the same belts with our suspenders. + */ + if (!arg) + return SECFailure; + + /* + * For sslmodes other than verify-full and verify-ca we don't perform peer + * validation, so return immediately. sslmode require with a database + * specified which contains a CA certificate will work like verify-ca to + * be compatible with the OpenSSL implementation. + */ + if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0) + { + if (conn->ssldatabase && + strlen(conn->ssldatabase) > 0 && + certificate_database_has_CA(conn)) + return SECFailure; + } + else if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "verify-full") == 0 || + strcmp(conn->sslmode, "verify-ca") == 0) + return SECFailure; + + err = PORT_GetError(); + + /* + * TODO: these are relevant error codes that can occur in certificate + * validation, figure out which we don't want for require/prefer etc. + */ + switch (err) + { + case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_AVA: + case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME: + case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE: + case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE: + case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER: + case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER: + case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT: + case SEC_ERROR_CERT_VALID: + case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE: + case SEC_ERROR_CRL_EXPIRED: + case SEC_ERROR_CRL_BAD_SIGNATURE: + case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID: + case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID: + case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID: + case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION: + return SECSuccess; + break; + default: + return SECFailure; + break; + } + + /* Unreachable */ + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */ +/* SSL information functions */ +/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */ + +/* + * PQgetssl + * + * Return NULL as this is legacy and defined to always be equal to calling + * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL"); This should ideally trigger a logged warning + * somewhere as it's nonsensical to run in a non-OpenSSL build. + */ +void * +PQgetssl(PGconn *conn) +{ + return NULL; +} + +void * +PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name) +{ + if (!conn) + return NULL; + + /* + * Return the underlying PRFileDesc which can be used to access + * information on the connection details. There is no SSL context per se. + */ + if (strcmp(struct_name, "NSS") == 0) + return conn->pr_fd; + return NULL; +} + +const char *const * +PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn) +{ + static const char *const result[] = { + "library", + "cipher", + "protocol", + "key_bits", + "compression", + NULL + }; + + return result; +} + +const char * +PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name) +{ + SECStatus status; + SSLChannelInfo channel; + SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite; + + if (!conn || !conn->pr_fd) + return NULL; + + if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0) + return "NSS"; + + status = SSL_GetChannelInfo(conn->pr_fd, &channel, sizeof(channel)); + if (status != SECSuccess) + return NULL; + + status = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, &suite, sizeof(suite)); + if (status != SECSuccess) + return NULL; + + if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0) + return suite.cipherSuiteName; + + if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0) + { + static char key_bits_str[8]; + + snprintf(key_bits_str, sizeof(key_bits_str), "%i", suite.effectiveKeyBits); + return key_bits_str; + } + + if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0) + return ssl_protocol_version_to_string(channel.protocolVersion); + + /* + * NSS disabled support for compression in version 3.33, and it was only + * available for SSLv3 at that point anyways, so we can safely return off + * here without checking. + */ + if (strcmp(attribute_name, "compression") == 0) + return "off"; + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * ssl_protocol_param_to_nss + * + * Return the NSS internal representation of the protocol asked for by the + * user as a connection param. + */ +static int +ssl_protocol_param_to_nss(const char *protocol) +{ + if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1", protocol) == 0) + return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0; + +#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 + if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.1", protocol) == 0) + return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1; +#endif + +#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 + if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.2", protocol) == 0) + return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2; +#endif + +#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 + if (pg_strcasecmp("TLSv1.3", protocol) == 0) + return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; +#endif + + return -1; +} + +/* + * certificate_database_has_CA + * Check for the presence of a CA certificate + * + * Returns true in case there is a CA certificate in the database connected + * to in the conn object, else false. This function only checks for the + * presence of a CA certificate, not it's validity and/or usefulness. + */ +static bool +certificate_database_has_CA(PGconn *conn) +{ + CERTCertList *certificates; + bool hasCA; + + /* + * If the certificate database has a password we must provide it, since + * this API doesn't invoke the standard password callback. + */ + if (conn->has_password) + certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, PQssl_passwd_cb(NULL, PR_FALSE, (void *) conn)); + else + certificates = PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL); + hasCA = !CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certificates); + CERT_DestroyCertList(certificates); + + return hasCA; +} + +PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type +PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void) +{ + return PQsslKeyPassHook; +} + +void +PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook) +{ + PQsslKeyPassHook = hook; +} + +/* + * PQssl_passwd_cb + * Supply a password to decrypt an object + * + * If an object in the NSS database is password protected, or if the entire + * NSS database is itself password protected, this callback will be invoked. + * + * This must match NSS type PK11PasswordFunc. + */ +static char * +PQssl_passwd_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg) +{ + PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg; + + conn->has_password = true; + + if (PQsslKeyPassHook) + return PQsslKeyPassHook(slot, (PRBool) retry, arg); + else + return PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(slot, retry, arg); +} + +/* + * PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss + * Default password handler callback + * + * If no user defined password callback has been set up, the callback below + * will try the password set by the sslpassword parameter. Since we by legacy + * only have support for a single password, there is little reason to inspect + * the slot for the object in question. A TODO is to support different + * passwords for different objects, either via a DSL in sslpassword or with a + * new key/value style parameter. Users can supply their own password hook to + * do this of course, but it would be nice to support something in core too. + */ +char * +PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg) +{ + PGconn *conn = (PGconn *) arg; + + /* + * If the password didn't work the first time there is no point in + * retrying as it hasn't changed. + */ + if (retry != PR_TRUE && conn->sslpassword && strlen(conn->sslpassword) > 0) + return PORT_Strdup(conn->sslpassword); + + return NULL; +} diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c index b15d8d137c..d76eb4806f 100644 --- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c +++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c @@ -447,6 +447,27 @@ PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn) } #endif /* USE_OPENSSL */ +#ifndef USE_NSS + +PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type +PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void) +{ + return NULL; +} + +void +PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook) +{ + return; +} + +char * +PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg) +{ + return NULL; +} +#endif /* USE_NSS */ + /* Dummy version of GSSAPI information functions, when built without GSS support */ #ifndef ENABLE_GSS diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h index 227adde5a5..2ade6f8445 100644 --- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h +++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-fe.h @@ -650,6 +650,17 @@ extern PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(void); extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(PQsslKeyPassHook_OpenSSL_type hook); extern int PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL(char *buf, int size, PGconn *conn); +/* == in fe-secure-nss.c === */ +typedef struct PK11SlotInfoStr PK11SlotInfo; +typedef int PRIntn; +typedef PRIntn PRBool; + +/* Support for overriding sslpassword handling with a callback */ +typedef char *(*PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type) (PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg); +extern PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type PQgetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(void); +extern void PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PQsslKeyPassHook_nss_type hook); +extern char *PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_nss(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg); + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h index 3f7907127e..750afe54b3 100644 --- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h +++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h @@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ typedef struct #endif #endif /* USE_OPENSSL */ +#ifdef USE_NSS +#include "common/nss.h" +#endif + /* * POSTGRES backend dependent Constants. */ @@ -383,6 +387,7 @@ struct pg_conn char *sslrootcert; /* root certificate filename */ char *sslcrl; /* certificate revocation list filename */ char *sslcrldir; /* certificate revocation list directory name */ + char *ssldatabase; /* NSS certificate/key database */ char *requirepeer; /* required peer credentials for local sockets */ char *gssencmode; /* GSS mode (require,prefer,disable) */ char *krbsrvname; /* Kerberos service name */ @@ -523,6 +528,28 @@ struct pg_conn * removed as this locking is handled * internally in OpenSSL >= 1.1.0. */ #endif /* USE_OPENSSL */ + +/* + * The NSS/NSPR specific types aren't used to avoid pulling in the required + * headers here, as they are causing conflicts with PG definitions. + */ +#ifdef USE_NSS + NSSInitContext *nss_context; /* NSS connection specific context */ + PRFileDesc *pr_fd; /* NSPR file descriptor for the connection */ + + /* + * Track whether the NSS database has a password set or not. There is no + * API function for retrieving password status of a database, but we need + * to know since some NSS API calls require the password passed in (they + * don't call the callback themselves). To track, we simply flip this to + * true in case NSS invoked the password callback - as that will only + * happen in case there is a password. The reason for tracking this is + * that there are calls which require a password parameter, but doesn't + * use the callbacks provided, so we must call the callback on behalf of + * these. + */ + bool has_password; +#endif /* USE_NSS */ #endif /* USE_SSL */ #ifdef ENABLE_GSS @@ -784,7 +811,7 @@ extern ssize_t pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len); * This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have * the X509_get_signature_nid() function. */ -#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID) +#if defined(USE_NSS) || (defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)) #define HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH extern char *pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(PGconn *conn, size_t *len); #endif diff --git a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out index 59e4e27ffb..2d374f5040 100644 --- a/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out +++ b/contrib/postgres_fdw/expected/postgres_fdw.out @@ -8913,7 +8913,7 @@ DO $d$ END; $d$; ERROR: invalid option "password" -HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, sslcrldir, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size, batch_size, async_capable, keep_connections +HINT: Valid options in this context are: service, passfile, channel_binding, connect_timeout, dbname, host, hostaddr, port, options, application_name, keepalives, keepalives_idle, keepalives_interval, keepalives_count, tcp_user_timeout, sslmode, sslcompression, sslcert, sslkey, sslrootcert, sslcrl, sslcrldir, requirepeer, ssl_min_protocol_version, ssl_max_protocol_version, gssencmode, krbsrvname, gsslib, target_session_attrs, ssldatabase, use_remote_estimate, fdw_startup_cost, fdw_tuple_cost, extensions, updatable, fetch_size, batch_size, async_capable, keep_connections CONTEXT: SQL statement "ALTER SERVER loopback_nopw OPTIONS (ADD password 'dummypw')" PL/pgSQL function inline_code_block line 3 at EXECUTE -- If we add a password for our user mapping instead, we should get a different -- 2.31.0