GSS Auth issue when user member of lots of AD groups
Hi,
GSS authentication is working for users with small number of AD groups but getting below error when a user has larger number of groups. I believe it might to token size related, but they don't have issues when authenticating with Kerberos/GSS to other applications, only with Postgres.
failed: GSSAPI context establishment error: The routine must be called again to complete its function: Unknown error
Is this a hard limit or can this be configurable?
Also, what is the best way to debug this as the postgresql.log does not have anything useful. Running on Alma Linux 9
Thanks,
Chris
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[ pgsql-committers is completely inappropriate, redirecting to -bugs ]
Chris Gooch <cgooch@bamfunds.com> writes:
GSS authentication is working for users with small number of AD
groups but getting below error when a user has larger number of
groups. I believe it might to token size related, but they don't
have issues when authenticating with Kerberos/GSS to other
applications, only with Postgres.
failed: GSSAPI context establishment error: The routine must be called again to complete its function: Unknown error
Hmm. That must be coming from this bit in libpq:
/* Must have output.length > 0 */
if (output.length > PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))
{
pg_GSS_error(libpq_gettext("GSSAPI context establishment error"),
conn, major, minor);
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output);
return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
}
which makes it look like gss_init_sec_context wants us to send a
packet larger than PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE, which perhaps is a
plausible thing to happen if the user belongs to enough groups.
Unfortunately, elsewhere in the same file:
* NOTE: The client and server have to agree on the max packet size,
* because we have to pass an entire packet to GSSAPI at a time and we
* don't want the other side to send arbitrarily huge packets as we
* would have to allocate memory for them to then pass them to GSSAPI.
*
* Therefore, these two #define's are effectively part of the protocol
* spec and can't ever be changed.
*/
#define PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE 16384
#define PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE 16384
Not sure where to go from here. Unfortunately the person who
was mostly responsible for this code has left the project...
regards, tom lane
On Thu, May 22, 2025 at 8:46 AM Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
Hmm. That must be coming from this bit in libpq:
/* Must have output.length > 0 */
if (output.length > PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))
{
pg_GSS_error(libpq_gettext("GSSAPI context establishment error"),
conn, major, minor);
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output);
return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
}which makes it look like gss_init_sec_context wants us to send a
packet larger than PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE, which perhaps is a
plausible thing to happen if the user belongs to enough groups.
Yeah, it seems like we need to be able to handle up to
PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH (64k) for that initial ticket, at least?
* Therefore, these two #define's are effectively part of the protocol
* spec and can't ever be changed.
*/
#define PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE 16384
#define PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE 16384
We can't increase our send buffer size without risking breakage, but a
peer could choose to receive larger initial packets without issue.
Then it comes down to deciding when to flip the sender into that
extended mode. Unfortunately this happens prior to feature
negotiation, and I don't see any obvious extension points yet. (Other
than introducing a completely new negotiation code, which would make
the existing fallback logic even worse than it is today.) Maybe the
user could just opt in for a few releases.
But also, the current behavior is just to fail hard, so if the client
tries to do something extra that also sometimes fails hard, it may not
really be a regression...
--Jacob
Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com> writes:
On Thu, May 22, 2025 at 8:46 AM Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
Hmm. That must be coming from this bit in libpq:
...
which makes it look like gss_init_sec_context wants us to send a
packet larger than PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE, which perhaps is a
plausible thing to happen if the user belongs to enough groups.
Yeah, it seems like we need to be able to handle up to
PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH (64k) for that initial ticket, at least?
Hmm, unfortunate that that was chosen independent of the GSS limits.
But also, the current behavior is just to fail hard, so if the client
tries to do something extra that also sometimes fails hard, it may not
really be a regression...
Yeah, that's a good point. If we simply allowed the initial packet
to be bigger, that would extend the set of cases that work, and if the
recipient complains (because it predates that change) then it's a case
that would have failed anyway, so we've not made anybody's life worse.
I'm wondering though if this isn't just pushing the problem out a
little further. Is there a good reason to think 64K is enough?
regards, tom lane
Thanks both.
It now makes sense to me. I believe the KDC will not allow tokens larger than 65535 bytes, so feel it is safe from a GSS perspective.
Thanks
Chris
________________________________
From: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Sent: Thursday, May 22, 2025 5:57:14 PM
To: Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com>
Cc: Chris Gooch <cgooch@bamfunds.com>; pgsql-bugs@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-bugs@lists.postgresql.org>
Subject: [EXT] Re: GSS Auth issue when user member of lots of AD groups
Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com> writes:
On Thu, May 22, 2025 at 8:46 AM Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
Hmm. That must be coming from this bit in libpq:
...
which makes it look like gss_init_sec_context wants us to send a
packet larger than PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE, which perhaps is a
plausible thing to happen if the user belongs to enough groups.
Yeah, it seems like we need to be able to handle up to
PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH (64k) for that initial ticket, at least?
Hmm, unfortunate that that was chosen independent of the GSS limits.
But also, the current behavior is just to fail hard, so if the client
tries to do something extra that also sometimes fails hard, it may not
really be a regression...
Yeah, that's a good point. If we simply allowed the initial packet
to be bigger, that would extend the set of cases that work, and if the
recipient complains (because it predates that change) then it's a case
that would have failed anyway, so we've not made anybody's life worse.
I'm wondering though if this isn't just pushing the problem out a
little further. Is there a good reason to think 64K is enough?
regards, tom lane
This email and any attachments should not be construed as an offer or recommendation to sell or buy or a solicitation of an offer to sell or buy any specific security, fund or instrument or to participate in any particular investment strategy. The information contained herein is given as of a certain date and does not purport to give information as of any other date. Although the information presented herein has been obtained from sources we believe to be reliable, no representation or warranty, expressed or implied, is made as to the accuracy or completeness of that information. Past performance is not indicative of future results.
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On Thu, May 22, 2025 at 9:57 AM Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
I'm wondering though if this isn't just pushing the problem out a
little further. Is there a good reason to think 64K is enough?
Microsoft docs [1]https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/kerberos-authentication-problems-if-user-belongs-to-groups#known-issues-that-affect-maxtokensize seem to imply that there are still a bunch of
existing problems if you try to go much higher, though it is possible
to do so with registry tweaks. Looks like they default to 48k.
Maybe we should consider making the max incoming ticket size
configurable, so users that really need a bigger one can deal with the
DoS risk without it affecting everyone else. (A limit on outgoing
tickets probably doesn't make too much sense; I imagine you're going
to use the ticket that GSSAPI hands you, no matter how big it is,
because it's not as if you have a choice.)
--Jacob
Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com> writes:
On Thu, May 22, 2025 at 9:57 AM Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
I'm wondering though if this isn't just pushing the problem out a
little further. Is there a good reason to think 64K is enough?
Microsoft docs [1] seem to imply that there are still a bunch of
existing problems if you try to go much higher, though it is possible
to do so with registry tweaks. Looks like they default to 48k.
Maybe we should consider making the max incoming ticket size
configurable, so users that really need a bigger one can deal with the
DoS risk without it affecting everyone else. (A limit on outgoing
tickets probably doesn't make too much sense; I imagine you're going
to use the ticket that GSSAPI hands you, no matter how big it is,
because it's not as if you have a choice.)
Yeah, but we don't want to change the packet size used after the
initial exchange, because that would create compatibility issues
in cases that aren't failing today. I didn't look at the code
to see if we can easily use a different buffer size during
the authentication exchange. If we can, I'd be inclined to goose
it up to 128K or so. Given Chris' point that should be plenty,
so I don't feel a need to expose a knob.
regards, tom lane
Hi Both, Will anyone be working on a fix for this bug?
Thanks
Chris
________________________________
From: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Sent: Thursday, May 22, 2025 6:58:33 PM
To: Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com>
Cc: Chris Gooch <cgooch@bamfunds.com>; pgsql-bugs@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-bugs@lists.postgresql.org>
Subject: [EXT] Re: GSS Auth issue when user member of lots of AD groups
Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com> writes:
On Thu, May 22, 2025 at 9:57 AM Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
I'm wondering though if this isn't just pushing the problem out a
little further. Is there a good reason to think 64K is enough?
Microsoft docs [1] seem to imply that there are still a bunch of
existing problems if you try to go much higher, though it is possible
to do so with registry tweaks. Looks like they default to 48k.
Maybe we should consider making the max incoming ticket size
configurable, so users that really need a bigger one can deal with the
DoS risk without it affecting everyone else. (A limit on outgoing
tickets probably doesn't make too much sense; I imagine you're going
to use the ticket that GSSAPI hands you, no matter how big it is,
because it's not as if you have a choice.)
Yeah, but we don't want to change the packet size used after the
initial exchange, because that would create compatibility issues
in cases that aren't failing today. I didn't look at the code
to see if we can easily use a different buffer size during
the authentication exchange. If we can, I'd be inclined to goose
it up to 128K or so. Given Chris' point that should be plenty,
so I don't feel a need to expose a knob.
regards, tom lane
This email and any attachments should not be construed as an offer or recommendation to sell or buy or a solicitation of an offer to sell or buy any specific security, fund or instrument or to participate in any particular investment strategy. The information contained herein is given as of a certain date and does not purport to give information as of any other date. Although the information presented herein has been obtained from sources we believe to be reliable, no representation or warranty, expressed or implied, is made as to the accuracy or completeness of that information. Past performance is not indicative of future results.
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Chris Gooch <cgooch@bamfunds.com> writes:
Hi Both, Will anyone be working on a fix for this bug?
Yeah, I will pick it up (unless Jacob's already on it?)
I believe we've agreed that it'd be sufficient if we allow the
packets exchanged during the auth phase to be up to 64K or so,
but once we reach the point where we're able to split the
data on arbitrary boundaries, keep the packet size at 16K
for cross-version compatibility. I did look at the code
briefly, and this seems like it'd require releasing and
re-alloc'ing the buffers, but that's surely doable.
regards, tom lane
I wrote:
I believe we've agreed that it'd be sufficient if we allow the
packets exchanged during the auth phase to be up to 64K or so,
but once we reach the point where we're able to split the
data on arbitrary boundaries, keep the packet size at 16K
for cross-version compatibility.
OK, here's a set of draft patches for that. (The HEAD one works
on v16 and v17 too, the v15 one works on v14 too. They are all
basically the same, but we kept revising libpq's internal convention
for error reports ...)
I am not in a great position to test these with a setup that actually
needs larger auth messages; I wonder if Chris can test?
Some notes:
* Is 128kB unreasonably large? I think we may want some daylight
above 64kB, but I'm not sure how much.
* I concluded that the error report that's being given for the case
is just flat-out bogus. The GSSAPI library has not given us an
error report so asking it for info is useless, which leads to the
very unhelpful error message Chris showed. We should just report
"client tried to send oversize GSSAPI packet" as we do elsewhere.
* It seems pretty silly to have separate symbols for
PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE and PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE
when we're requiring those to be the same, so I merged
them into one symbol PQ_GSS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE.
* The backend's secure_open_gssapi allowed received initialization packets
to be up to buffer-size long, whereas libpq will choke sending them
if they're more than buffer-size minus sizeof(uint32). This isn't
actually a bug, since the buffer management is handled in such a way
that it's safe, but it seems very inconsistent. I changed the limit
to subtract off sizeof(uint32) in all cases, which incidentally
allowed removing one variant of the translatable message string.
regards, tom lane
I wrote:
OK, here's a set of draft patches for that.
Sigh, it'd help if I actually attached the patches ...
regards, tom lane
On Thu, May 22, 2025 at 05:04:32PM +0000, Chris Gooch wrote:
It now makes sense to me. I believe the KDC will not allow tokens
larger than 65535 bytes, so feel it is safe from a GSS perspective.
The KDC protocol over TCP uses 32-bit unsigned PDU lengths in network
byte order, of which the high bit is reserved and must be zero. ASN.1
supports much larger lengths still. The protocol easily supports very
large tickets, therefore very large initial security context tokens.
The architecture of having the user's SIDs be included in the user's
service tickets was very useful as an optimization for a long time, but
as the number of SIDs increases this optimization becomes more of an
albatross.
Nico
--
Thanks Tom. More than happy to give these patches a test as I can easily reproduce the bug.
Are there specific test cases you would like me to try?
Thanks,
Chris
________________________________
From: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Sent: Saturday, May 24, 2025 8:38 pm
To: Chris Gooch <cgooch@bamfunds.com>
Cc: Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com>; pgsql-bugs@lists.postgresql.org <pgsql-bugs@lists.postgresql.org>
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: GSS Auth issue when user member of lots of AD groups
I wrote:
OK, here's a set of draft patches for that.
Sigh, it'd help if I actually attached the patches ...
regards, tom lane
This email and any attachments should not be construed as an offer or recommendation to sell or buy or a solicitation of an offer to sell or buy any specific security, fund or instrument or to participate in any particular investment strategy. The information contained herein is given as of a certain date and does not purport to give information as of any other date. Although the information presented herein has been obtained from sources we believe to be reliable, no representation or warranty, expressed or implied, is made as to the accuracy or completeness of that information. Past performance is not indicative of future results.
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This message and any attachment are confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, please telephone or email the sender and delete this message and any attachment from your system. If you are not the intended recipient you must not copy this message or attachment or disclose the contents to any other persons.
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BAM prohibits all personnel from having any business related communications over text message or other unapproved communication applications. Unless pre-approved, BAM employees are only permitted to communicate over email, Bloomberg and BAM telephone lines.
Chris Gooch <cgooch@bamfunds.com> writes:
Thanks Tom. More than happy to give these patches a test as I can easily reproduce the bug.
Great!
Are there specific test cases you would like me to try?
Obviously, check if it works for the user with lots of AD groups.
But beyond that, just check it in everyday use. All I've done is
to run our "kerberos" regression test, and I don't have a huge
amount of faith in the coverage of that.
regards, tom lane
I wrote:
Chris Gooch <cgooch@bamfunds.com> writes:
Are there specific test cases you would like me to try?
Obviously, check if it works for the user with lots of AD groups.
But beyond that, just check it in everyday use.
Oh --- one specific scenario that would be good to check is to
verify that patched libpq can still use GSS with unpatched
server and vice versa, so long as the ticket doesn't exceed 16K.
regards, tom lane
Thanks again for sharing the patches Tom.
I have just tested the following combinations on v17 and all working as expected, both with tickets less thank 16k and greater than 16k.
1. Patched Client to Unpatched Server
2. Unpatched Client to Patched Server
3. Patched Client to Patched Server
Thanks,
Chris
-----Original Message-----
From: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Sent: Sunday, May 25, 2025 4:51 PM
To: Chris Gooch <cgooch@bamfunds.com>
Cc: Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com>; pgsql-bugs@lists.postgresql.org
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: GSS Auth issue when user member of lots of AD groups
I wrote:
Chris Gooch <cgooch@bamfunds.com> writes:
Are there specific test cases you would like me to try?
Obviously, check if it works for the user with lots of AD groups.
But beyond that, just check it in everyday use.
Oh --- one specific scenario that would be good to check is to verify that patched libpq can still use GSS with unpatched server and vice versa, so long as the ticket doesn't exceed 16K.
regards, tom lane
This email and any attachments should not be construed as an offer or recommendation to sell or buy or a solicitation of an offer to sell or buy any specific security, fund or instrument or to participate in any particular investment strategy. The information contained herein is given as of a certain date and does not purport to give information as of any other date. Although the information presented herein has been obtained from sources we believe to be reliable, no representation or warranty, expressed or implied, is made as to the accuracy or completeness of that information. Past performance is not indicative of future results.
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This message and any attachment are confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, please telephone or email the sender and delete this message and any attachment from your system. If you are not the intended recipient you must not copy this message or attachment or disclose the contents to any other persons.
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On Sat, May 24, 2025 at 12:37 PM Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
OK, here's a set of draft patches for that.
I haven't reviewed the code in detail yet, but here are some thoughts
on your notes:
* Is 128kB unreasonably large? I think we may want some daylight
above 64kB, but I'm not sure how much.
Having a different token limit between gssenc and non-gssenc users
doesn't seem right to me; if you somehow start relying on the much
larger tokens with gssenc, and later want to switch to TLS, you'd
suddenly be out of luck.
(A larger token does apparently help with unconstrained delegation.
But that page I shared from Microsoft upthread is saying that the
deprecation of unconstrained delegation, plus SID compression, means
that 48k should be good enough for anyone. Whether or not that's true
in practice, I don't know, and I think 64k should definitely be our
minimum.)
* I concluded that the error report that's being given for the case
is just flat-out bogus.
+1
* It seems pretty silly to have separate symbols for
PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE and PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE
when we're requiring those to be the same, so I merged
them into one symbol PQ_GSS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE.
That seems fine.
* The backend's secure_open_gssapi allowed received initialization packets
to be up to buffer-size long, whereas libpq will choke sending them
if they're more than buffer-size minus sizeof(uint32). This isn't
actually a bug, since the buffer management is handled in such a way
that it's safe, but it seems very inconsistent. I changed the limit
to subtract off sizeof(uint32) in all cases, which incidentally
allowed removing one variant of the translatable message string.
That discrepancy is confusing to me. Is there a way to standardize
both sides in the other direction, so that they actually handle tokens
up to the "max size"?
--Jacob
Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com> writes:
On Sat, May 24, 2025 at 12:37 PM Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
* The backend's secure_open_gssapi allowed received initialization packets
to be up to buffer-size long, whereas libpq will choke sending them
if they're more than buffer-size minus sizeof(uint32). This isn't
actually a bug, since the buffer management is handled in such a way
that it's safe, but it seems very inconsistent. I changed the limit
to subtract off sizeof(uint32) in all cases, which incidentally
allowed removing one variant of the translatable message string.
That discrepancy is confusing to me. Is there a way to standardize
both sides in the other direction, so that they actually handle tokens
up to the "max size"?
I don't think so, because that would create exactly the cross-version
discrepancy we need to avoid. (That is, if sender thinks it can do
16384 when receiver's limit is 16384-4, kaboom.) The patch proposes
to allow slop in this during the auth phase when the packet size is
really being determined by the underlying GSSAPI library anyway.
But once we're past that and our own code is slicing up the data
stream into packets, I think the max packet size is indeed an
inalterable part of the protocol.
Could we address your confusion by improving the comment about the
packet-size #define to point out that it includes the header word?
regards, tom lane
On Tue, May 27, 2025 at 3:15 PM Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
I don't think so, because that would create exactly the cross-version
discrepancy we need to avoid. (That is, if sender thinks it can do
16384 when receiver's limit is 16384-4, kaboom.) The patch proposes
to allow slop in this during the auth phase when the packet size is
really being determined by the underlying GSSAPI library anyway.
But once we're past that and our own code is slicing up the data
stream into packets, I think the max packet size is indeed an
inalterable part of the protocol.
Oh, I see. Yeah, that's unfortunate but makes sense.
Could we address your confusion by improving the comment about the
packet-size #define to point out that it includes the header word?
Yes, I think so.
Thanks!
--Jacob
Would this patch be targeting next release cycle in August?
Thanks,
Chris
-----Original Message-----
From: Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com>
Sent: Tuesday, May 27, 2025 11:25 PM
To: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Cc: Chris Gooch <cgooch@bamfunds.com>; pgsql-bugs@lists.postgresql.org
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: GSS Auth issue when user member of lots of AD groups
On Tue, May 27, 2025 at 3:15 PM Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
I don't think so, because that would create exactly the cross-version
discrepancy we need to avoid. (That is, if sender thinks it can do
16384 when receiver's limit is 16384-4, kaboom.) The patch proposes
to allow slop in this during the auth phase when the packet size is
really being determined by the underlying GSSAPI library anyway.
But once we're past that and our own code is slicing up the data
stream into packets, I think the max packet size is indeed an
inalterable part of the protocol.
Oh, I see. Yeah, that's unfortunate but makes sense.
Could we address your confusion by improving the comment about the
packet-size #define to point out that it includes the header word?
Yes, I think so.
Thanks!
--Jacob
This email and any attachments should not be construed as an offer or recommendation to sell or buy or a solicitation of an offer to sell or buy any specific security, fund or instrument or to participate in any particular investment strategy. The information contained herein is given as of a certain date and does not purport to give information as of any other date. Although the information presented herein has been obtained from sources we believe to be reliable, no representation or warranty, expressed or implied, is made as to the accuracy or completeness of that information. Past performance is not indicative of future results.
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This message and any attachment are confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, please telephone or email the sender and delete this message and any attachment from your system. If you are not the intended recipient you must not copy this message or attachment or disclose the contents to any other persons.
Balyasny Asset Management (UK) LLP is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in the UK. Balyasny Asset Management LP is registered as an Investment Advisor with the Securities and Exchange Commission in the USA.
BAM prohibits all personnel from having any business related communications over text message or other unapproved communication applications. Unless pre-approved, BAM employees are only permitted to communicate over email, Bloomberg and BAM telephone lines.